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12. - Animation

from A

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 January 2025

By
Oberto Marrama
Edited by
Karolina Hübner  and
Justin Steinberg
Karolina Hübner
Affiliation:
Cornell University, New York
Justin Steinberg
Affiliation:
Cornell University, New York
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Summary

The concept of “animation” figures in the scholium to E2p13, where Spinoza discusses his demonstration of the mind–body union. He writes that “the things we have shown so far are completely general and do not pertain more to man than to other individuals, all of which, though in different degrees, are nevertheless animate [omnia, quamvis diversis gradibus, animata tamen sunt]” (E2p13s, ii/96).

Type
Chapter
Information
The Cambridge Spinoza Lexicon , pp. 30 - 32
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2024

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References

Recommended Reading

Bouveresse, R. (1992). Spinoza et Leibniz: L’idée d’animisme universel. J. Vrin.Google Scholar
Della Rocca, M. (2008). Spinoza. Routledge.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lin, M. (2019). Spinoza’s panpsychism. In Seager, W. (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Panpsychism (pp. 36–43). Routledge.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Marrama, O. (2017). Consciousness, ideas of ideas and animation in Spinoza’s Ethics. British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 25(3), 506–25.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Perler, D. (2014). Spinoza über Tiere. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, 96(2), 232–61.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wilson, M. D. (1999). Objects, ideas and “minds”: Comments on Spinoza’s theory of mind. In Wilson, , Ideas and Mechanism: Essays on Early Modern Philosophy (pp. 126–40). Princeton University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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