Military doctrine and planning in the interwar era

doi:10.1017/CHO9781139021203.017

14 - Military doctrine and planning in the interwar era

from Part II - The Era of Total War, 1914–1945

Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 December 2012

Edited by

Dennis Showalter and

Roger Chickering: Affiliation:
Georgetown University, Washington DC
Dennis Showalter: Affiliation:
Colorado College
Hans van de Ven: Affiliation:
University of Cambridge

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Summary

Twentieth-century military studies commonly treat the period 1919–39 as one of preparation for World War II. Apart from its teleology, this orthodox narrative is limited by a technological emphasis. The interwar years become a Eurocentric historical laboratory, in which historians assess how well the participants combined past experience, evolving technology, and prognostications. Who demonstrated the highest level of military effectiveness in preparing for World War II? In the process, who offered the best model from which successor military organizations should learn?

This chapter looks beyond this narrative and the telos of World War II in three contexts. One is social, in this term’s broad sense. To say, for example, that “the German and Soviet militaries had spent the previous twenty years imagining future conflict and arming their nations to win the coming war of technology” is to obscure the nature of doctrinal development. Doctrine, the stated subject of this chapter, does not derive cleanly from a synergy of military theory and weapons’ capabilities, but results instead from the complex interaction of political, economic, cultural, and other factors.

Type: Chapter
Information: The Cambridge History of War , pp. 327 - 351

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CHO9781139021203.017 [Opens in a new window]

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Print publication year: 2012

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14 - Military doctrine and planning in the interwar era

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