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23 - The era of American hegemony, 1989–2005

from Part III - Post-total warfare, 1945–2005

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 December 2012

By
Mark Moyar
Edited by
Roger Chickering ,
Dennis Showalter  and
Hans van de Ven
Roger Chickering
Affiliation:
Georgetown University, Washington DC
Dennis Showalter
Affiliation:
Colorado College
Hans van de Ven
Affiliation:
University of Cambridge
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Summary

On November 9, 1989, Heinz Kessler was forced, much against his desires, to make one of the most momentous decisions of the Cold War. The former chief ideologist of the East German army, Kessler was now East Germany’s defense minister, which gave him authority over the best military, man-for-man, that the Warsaw Pact had to offer. This chilly autumn day, Kessler himself watched massive throngs of East Berliners heading toward entry points in the Berlin Wall after the announcement, by an East German official, that the country’s borders were open. Having received no advance warning of the announcement, Kessler had not provided guidance to his border troops, with the result that these troops did nothing to restrain the surge of their countrymen toward the wall. Once Kessler understood what was happening, he ordered an artillery regiment to gather ammunition for possible operations to halt the rush of people and prevent the dismantling of the wall.

Kessler phoned one of his generals to ask whether he was ready to send two other regiments to Berlin. But this general and several others warned against bringing army units to the capital, predicting that it could lead to a bloodbath. Kessler was despondent at their aversion to the use of force, but he had enough sense to know that the game was lost. He allowed the sea of humans to flow from East Berlin into West Berlin, sounding the death-knell for Communist East Germany and the ideology to which men like Kessler had devoted their lives. East Germany was absorbed by West Germany, on West German terms. Its army was soon absorbed, in like fashion, by the West German Bundeswehr.

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Chapter
Information
The Cambridge History of War , pp. 566 - 588
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2012

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