Book contents
- The Cambridge History of The Second World War
- The Cambridge History of the Second World War
- The Cambridge History of The Second World War
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Illustrations
- Figures
- Maps
- Tables
- Contributors to Volume I
- General introduction
- Introduction to Volume I
- Part I Grand Strategies
- Part II Campaigns
- Introduction to Part II
- 9 Campaigns in China, 1937–1945
- 10 The war in the West, 1939–1940
- 11 The war in the West, 1939–1940
- 12 Operations on the Eastern Front, 1941–1945
- 13 The Mediterranean and North Africa, 1940–1944
- 14 The war in the West, 1943–1945
- 15 The war in the Pacific, 1941–1945
- 16 The Atlantic war, 1939–1945
- 17 Anglo-American strategic bombing, 1940–1945
- Part III Fighting Forces
- Bibliographical essays
- Index
- Plate Section (PDF Only)
13 - The Mediterranean and North Africa, 1940–1944
from Part II - Campaigns
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2015
By
Book contents
- The Cambridge History of The Second World War
- The Cambridge History of the Second World War
- The Cambridge History of The Second World War
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Illustrations
- Figures
- Maps
- Tables
- Contributors to Volume I
- General introduction
- Introduction to Volume I
- Part I Grand Strategies
- Part II Campaigns
- Introduction to Part II
- 9 Campaigns in China, 1937–1945
- 10 The war in the West, 1939–1940
- 11 The war in the West, 1939–1940
- 12 Operations on the Eastern Front, 1941–1945
- 13 The Mediterranean and North Africa, 1940–1944
- 14 The war in the West, 1943–1945
- 15 The war in the Pacific, 1941–1945
- 16 The Atlantic war, 1939–1945
- 17 Anglo-American strategic bombing, 1940–1945
- Part III Fighting Forces
- Bibliographical essays
- Index
- Plate Section (PDF Only)
Summary
The distinctive character of the war in the Mediterranean was shaped by the existence of four strategic dispositions. Fighting for territory around the Mediterranean was the preserve of those called as dominators, fighting to get through the Mediterranean, voyagers, and fighting to get out of the Mediterranean, escapers. A hostile Italy made it hard to imagine the artery as a centrepiece of strategy. The Royal Navy used a friendly defence correspondent, Hector Bywater, subsequently famous as the man who predicted Pearl Harbor, to put its doubts into the public domain. The 'arterial strategy' made the most sense of the North African campaigns. Winston Churchill came close to suggesting that not only the British Army but the Royal Navy needed to deliver a blood sacrifice to prove it could face the Germans. The failure to concentrate resources in the Mediterranean was the fundamental mistake identified by the German Commander Marshal Kesselring.
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- The Cambridge History of the Second World War , pp. 358 - 388Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2015
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