Book contents
- Frontmatter
- 1 The Cold War and the international history of the twentieth century
- 2 Ideology and the origins of the Cold War, 1917–1962
- 3 The world economy and the Cold War in the middle of the twentieth century
- 4 The emergence of an American grand strategy, 1945–1952
- 5 The Soviet Union and the world, 1944–1953
- 6 Britain and the Cold War, 1945–1955
- 7 The division of Germany, 1945–1949
- 8 The Marshall Plan and the creation of the West
- 9 The Sovietization of Eastern Europe, 1944–1953
- 10 The Cold War in the Balkans, 1945–1956
- 11 The birth of the People’s Republic of China and the road to the Korean War
- 12 Japan, the United States, and the Cold War, 1945–1960
- 13 The Korean War
- 14 US national security policy from Eisenhower to Kennedy
- 15 Soviet foreign policy, 1953–1962
- 16 East Central Europe, 1953–1956
- 17 The Sino-Soviet alliance and the Cold War in Asia, 1954–1962
- 18 Nuclear weapons and the escalation of the Cold War, 1945–1962
- 19 Culture and the Cold War in Europe
- 20 Cold War mobilization and domestic politics: the United States
- 21 Cold War mobilisation and domestic politics: the Soviet Union
- 22 Decolonization, the global South, and the Cold War, 1919–1962
- 23 Oil, resources, and the Cold War, 1945–1962
- Bibliographical essay
- Index
- References
3 - The world economy and the Cold War in the middle of the twentieth century
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 September 2010
- Frontmatter
- 1 The Cold War and the international history of the twentieth century
- 2 Ideology and the origins of the Cold War, 1917–1962
- 3 The world economy and the Cold War in the middle of the twentieth century
- 4 The emergence of an American grand strategy, 1945–1952
- 5 The Soviet Union and the world, 1944–1953
- 6 Britain and the Cold War, 1945–1955
- 7 The division of Germany, 1945–1949
- 8 The Marshall Plan and the creation of the West
- 9 The Sovietization of Eastern Europe, 1944–1953
- 10 The Cold War in the Balkans, 1945–1956
- 11 The birth of the People’s Republic of China and the road to the Korean War
- 12 Japan, the United States, and the Cold War, 1945–1960
- 13 The Korean War
- 14 US national security policy from Eisenhower to Kennedy
- 15 Soviet foreign policy, 1953–1962
- 16 East Central Europe, 1953–1956
- 17 The Sino-Soviet alliance and the Cold War in Asia, 1954–1962
- 18 Nuclear weapons and the escalation of the Cold War, 1945–1962
- 19 Culture and the Cold War in Europe
- 20 Cold War mobilization and domestic politics: the United States
- 21 Cold War mobilisation and domestic politics: the Soviet Union
- 22 Decolonization, the global South, and the Cold War, 1919–1962
- 23 Oil, resources, and the Cold War, 1945–1962
- Bibliographical essay
- Index
- References
Summary
Vice President Richard M. Nixon boasted about American color television to Nikita Khrushchev, the first secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, during their famous “kitchen debate” of July 1959, but the early Cold War was fought in black and white. The issues were monochrome and so were the images: stacks of Marshall Plan flour on an Italian wharf, C-47s approaching Tempelhof airport over the ruins of Berlin during the blockade, films of blast furnaces with white sparks emitted against a night sky, and the photos of the American vice president and the Soviet first secretary debating the path to household affluence in a Moscow exposition hall. At stake in that model American kitchen was consumer affluence or collective prowess, suburban dreams of the Eisenhower years versus Khrushchev’s cocky promise from 1956, “We will bury you,” rendered plausible a year later by the trail of Sputnik in the night sky.
Still, when Nixon and Khrushchev debated their societies’ respective achievements, they agreed that peaceful competition was preferable to ruthless military or political confrontation. Peaceful competition meant primarily economic competition: the rivalry between capitalism and state socialism. Divergent economic systems should not be so menacing that they compelled a strategic arms race; the two sides had not organized extensive alliances just to defend private or state ownership of capital, the market or the plan. Nonetheless, distinctions between socialism and capitalism seemed fundamental to ideological identity and to bloc cohesion in the 1950s, as they would again in the 1980s when the state socialist economies showed evident signs of decomposition. Neither were the distinctions just a source of ideological identity, no more than the stake of economic rivalry was just household appliances. The two economic systems had to provide the resources to sustain the military confrontation and subsidize allies. National power depended on economic achievement — a point the American vice president recognized when he conceded that the Soviets still led in getting payloads into orbit.
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- Information
- The Cambridge History of the Cold War , pp. 44 - 66Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2010
References
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