The superpowers’ competition for allies constituted a large part of the Cold War in Asia. The alliance between the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in February 1950 seemed to be a major diplomatic victory for Moscow. How to maintain the alliance proved a serious challenge. Conventional wisdom dictates that the commonalities in ideological, economic, political, and security interests between the two Communist powers would sustain the compact. Along with the personal idiosyncrasies of Mao Zedong and Nikita Khrushchev, cultural, racial, and domestic factors, nevertheless, eroded the cohesion of the Sino-Soviet alliance. This chapter aims to reconstruct how Beijing and Moscow tried to maintain the alliance, and how the corrosive Sino-Soviet partnership affected the course of the Cold War in Asia.

From the Korean War to the Hungarian uprising

From the outset, the Sino-Soviet alliance was loaded with expectations and aspirations. When the alliance treaty was signed, China wanted more than the Soviet Union was willing to give: the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders aspired to secure Moscow’s commitment to defending China, not only to thwart a perceived threat from the United States, but also to ensure that the Kremlin would be a more reliable partner in the future than it had been in the past. They still remembered Stalin’s reluctance to support the CCP fully during China’s anti-Japanese war (1931–45) and his making deals with Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) during the civil war (1945–49). Ideologically, however, Mao had mixed feelings toward Stalin-style Communism. Although identifying himself as a Marxist, Mao aimed to apply Marxist-Leninist principles to Chinese realities. His open proclamation to “lean” to the Soviet side in 1949 was more a political move – intended to contain calls within and outside his party for taking a “third road” rather than following Soviet or American models – than an ideological requirement. For economic reconstruction, Beijing intended to learn from the Soviet experiences but without necessarily relying on Soviet assistance. Although trying to avoid expected Soviet interference, Mao found it unrealistic to be completely self-reliant, given China’s war-torn economy and political instability.