Book contents
- The Cambridge History of Strategy
- The Cambridge History of Strategy
- The Cambridge History of Strategy
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Maps
- Contributors to Volume II
- Preface and Acknowledgements
- Introduction to Volume II
- 1 The Strategies of the Napoleonic Wars
- 2 Guerrilla and Nineteenth-Century Strategies of Insurgency
- 3 Russia, 1877–1917
- 4 The American Civil War
- 5 The Use of Naval Power
- 6 The Russo-Japanese War
- 7 Chinese Strategy, 1926–1949
- 8 First World War
- 9 Soviet Strategy, 1917–1945
- 10 Air Power
- 11 The Second World War in Europe
- 12 The Second World War in the Asia–Pacific
- 13 Soviet Strategy, 1945–1989
- 14 People’s War and Wars of Decolonisation
- 15 Nuclear Strategies
- 16 America’s Way of War
- 17 The Korean War
- 18 Israel’s Wars
- 19 The India–Pakistan Confrontations
- 20 The Yugoslav War, 1991–1999
- 21 Terrorism and Insurgency
- 22 The Forty-Year War in Afghanistan
- 23 The Three Gulf Wars and Iraq
- 24 China’s Wars, 1950–2021
- Conclusion
- Further Reading
- Index
1 - The Strategies of the Napoleonic Wars
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 06 January 2025
- The Cambridge History of Strategy
- The Cambridge History of Strategy
- The Cambridge History of Strategy
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Maps
- Contributors to Volume II
- Preface and Acknowledgements
- Introduction to Volume II
- 1 The Strategies of the Napoleonic Wars
- 2 Guerrilla and Nineteenth-Century Strategies of Insurgency
- 3 Russia, 1877–1917
- 4 The American Civil War
- 5 The Use of Naval Power
- 6 The Russo-Japanese War
- 7 Chinese Strategy, 1926–1949
- 8 First World War
- 9 Soviet Strategy, 1917–1945
- 10 Air Power
- 11 The Second World War in Europe
- 12 The Second World War in the Asia–Pacific
- 13 Soviet Strategy, 1945–1989
- 14 People’s War and Wars of Decolonisation
- 15 Nuclear Strategies
- 16 America’s Way of War
- 17 The Korean War
- 18 Israel’s Wars
- 19 The India–Pakistan Confrontations
- 20 The Yugoslav War, 1991–1999
- 21 Terrorism and Insurgency
- 22 The Forty-Year War in Afghanistan
- 23 The Three Gulf Wars and Iraq
- 24 China’s Wars, 1950–2021
- Conclusion
- Further Reading
- Index
Summary
Napoleon is widely admired as a military strategist who embraced the violence of modern war and understood the potential of mass armies. Yet he wrote little about the practice of strategy beyond a few rather bland maxims, claiming to rely on offence and opportunism on the battlefield. But these offensive tactics had a strategic purpose. He sought to crush his opponents in decisive battles, not just to destroy enemy armies but to impose his will in the peace talks that followed. As First Consul and later as Emperor he channelled the resources of the state to the cause of military success and imperial expansion. His goal was political as much as it was military, mobilising all the resources of the Empire in its pursuit. Napoleon conscripted mass armies in the lands he conquered, imposed French-style administrative systems, and imposed taxes and customs duties. He was focused on Europe, where the other powers developed their own strategies to counter him, repeatedly forging alliances to defend their sovereignty and to thwart his imperial ambitions. Each country had its own war aims. Russia looked to expand into the Balkans, Prussia to conquer Poland, and Britain to consolidate its colonial presence overseas.
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- The Cambridge History of Strategy , pp. 18 - 37Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2025