Introductory comments

Nationality can be constructed as fact and value. Its construction as value presupposes its construction as fact. First, there are nations; second, nations are bearers of values. However, nations can be constructed as facts without regarding them also as bearers of values on which to base cultural or political programmes.

I define the principle of nationality as consisting of three claims: humanity is divided into nations; nations are worthy of recognition and respect; recognition and respect require autonomy, usually meaning political independence within the national territory. Thus the principle of nationality contains an empirical claim, a value assertion and a political goal, each building on the previous proposition. These are logical relationships; they do not necessarily occur in that chronological order. This principle was constructed in nineteenth–century Europe. The empirical, normative and programmatic constructions took on increasingly complex, differentiated and conflicting forms as the principle of nationality loomed an ever larger role in political culture and practice.