Humanlike robots, based on their behavior and physical appearance, are becoming an increasingly important part of society often interacting with individuals in a wide variety of social contexts. One emerging class of robots that socialize with humans are robots capable of expressing emotions, are humanoid in appearance, and anthropomorphized by users. For such robots I propose that how humans interact with them is represented as a four-way process depending on the following: (1) The context of the situation surrounding the interaction; (2) The effort that users make to comprehend the robotic technology especially in a particular context; (3) The process of the adaptation of robotic technology (by users or groups of users) to incorporate robots into their lives, practices, and work routines; and (4) The transformation of the technology and its subsequent meaning to the user. One aspect of the above points is that humans receive significant benefits by interacting with robots in different contexts. For example, by applying (or appropriating) the robot’s abilities to perform various tasks, humans may increase their own physical and intellectual abilities. However, unlike human creativity and innovation, which are a product of human cognition, robot creativity is based on the use of algorithms and software in which robots’ appropriate data is used to perform tasks. Further, a robot’s ability to express emotion and a personality may influence humans in a variety of ways; for example, the conditions under which they appropriate the robot’s labor or creative output for a particular reason. As I argue in this chapter, “robot appropriation” can lead to legal constraints and regulations between human and robot. On this point, I note that the continental legal order, to which the Russian legal system belongs, has developed a robust method for the conscious exercise of law. Based on the Russian legal system and the approach taken by other jurisdictions, an AI-enabled robot can only receive what are described as independent rights that are different in substance from the rights granted to natural persons. Taking a broad scope in this chapter, I propose that regulations are required for various human–robot interactions, and I discuss several examples of this approach.