Book contents
- The Cambridge Handbook of the Capability Approach
- The Cambridge Handbook of the Capability Approach
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Contributors
- Foreword
- Acknowledgements
- General Introduction
- Part I Historical Antecedents and Philosophical Debates
- Introduction to Part I
- 1 The Capabilities Approach and the History of Philosophy
- 2 Karl Marx and the Capabilities Approach
- 3 Utility and Capability
- 4 Intellectual History and Defending the Capabilities Approach
- 5 Sen, Smith and the Cambridge Tradition
- 6 The Capability Approach to Well-Being and Freedom from the Viewpoint of Welfare Economics and Social Choice Theory
- 7 Resources or Capabilities?
- 8 Taking Multidimensionality Seriously
- 9 The Capabilities Approach and Political Liberalism
- 10 Selecting a List
- 11 Individualism and the Capability Approach
- 12 The Politics of Wonder
- Part II Methods, Measurement and Empirical Evidence
- Part III Issues in Public Policy
- Index
- References
9 - The Capabilities Approach and Political Liberalism
from Part I - Historical Antecedents and Philosophical Debates
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 November 2020
Book contents
- The Cambridge Handbook of the Capability Approach
- The Cambridge Handbook of the Capability Approach
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Contributors
- Foreword
- Acknowledgements
- General Introduction
- Part I Historical Antecedents and Philosophical Debates
- Introduction to Part I
- 1 The Capabilities Approach and the History of Philosophy
- 2 Karl Marx and the Capabilities Approach
- 3 Utility and Capability
- 4 Intellectual History and Defending the Capabilities Approach
- 5 Sen, Smith and the Cambridge Tradition
- 6 The Capability Approach to Well-Being and Freedom from the Viewpoint of Welfare Economics and Social Choice Theory
- 7 Resources or Capabilities?
- 8 Taking Multidimensionality Seriously
- 9 The Capabilities Approach and Political Liberalism
- 10 Selecting a List
- 11 Individualism and the Capability Approach
- 12 The Politics of Wonder
- Part II Methods, Measurement and Empirical Evidence
- Part III Issues in Public Policy
- Index
- References
Summary
Prominent theories of justice conjoin the capabilities approach and a doctrine of ‘political liberalism’. The latter maintains that the exercise of state power is morally legitimate only if it is justifiable by appeal to principles that all reasonable citizens can accept, each from her own evaluative perspective. As standardly interpreted, political liberalism rules out selecting state policies on perfectionist grounds. The political perfectionist holds that it is morally mandatory for the state to promote certain activities and conditions on the ground that they are intrinsically valuable. The claim then is that reasonable citizens will differ widely in their beliefs about these intrinsic value matters, so a state that chooses its policies by appeal to perfectionist judgements will be morally illegitimate. This chapter canvasses recent debate on this issue, and suggests that the marriage of the capabilities approach and political liberalism is ill-advised. Political liberalism should be dropped, whether or not one adheres to the capabilities approach. A modest, common-sense perfectionism cohabits harmoniously with the capabilities approach.
Keywords
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The Cambridge Handbook of the Capability Approach , pp. 165 - 187Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2020
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