Book contents
- The Cambridge Handbook of Religious Epistemology
- Cambridge Handbooks in Philosophy
- The Cambridge Handbook of Religious Epistemology
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Tables
- Contributors
- Introduction
- Part I Faith and Rationality
- Part II Religious Traditions
- Part III New Directions
- 13 Trust, Testimony, and Religious Belief
- 14 Religious Disagreement
- 15 Franciscan Knowledge
- 16 Liturgically Infused Practical Understanding
- 17 Knowledge-First Epistemology and Religious Belief
- 18 Epistemic Disjunctivism and Religious Knowledge
- 19 Debunking Arguments and Religious Belief
- References
- Index
13 - Trust, Testimony, and Religious Belief
from Part III - New Directions
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 24 August 2023
- The Cambridge Handbook of Religious Epistemology
- Cambridge Handbooks in Philosophy
- The Cambridge Handbook of Religious Epistemology
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Tables
- Contributors
- Introduction
- Part I Faith and Rationality
- Part II Religious Traditions
- Part III New Directions
- 13 Trust, Testimony, and Religious Belief
- 14 Religious Disagreement
- 15 Franciscan Knowledge
- 16 Liturgically Infused Practical Understanding
- 17 Knowledge-First Epistemology and Religious Belief
- 18 Epistemic Disjunctivism and Religious Knowledge
- 19 Debunking Arguments and Religious Belief
- References
- Index
Summary
“Trust in the Lord with all your heart and lean not on your own understanding” (Proverbs 3:5). This is not exactly what a broadly Descartes-inspired epistemologist likes to hear. But trust and testimony clearly play an important role in religious life, according to many traditions. And, separately, there has been a contemporary revival of philosophical interest in trust and testimony – their nature and value for our lives broadly. The present chapter reviews contemporary conversations about trust and testimony in ethics and epistemology to consider their applications to religious epistemology. It is suggested that antireductionism about testimony and noncognitivism about trust are each “friendlier” than their counterpart views, to the appropriateness of religious belief. Finally, the chapter raises the question whether robust trust in God requires a disposition to feel betrayed by God in certain circumstances, and ventures a positive, though qualified, answer.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The Cambridge Handbook of Religious Epistemology , pp. 193 - 207Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2023