Introduction

This volume is witness to the importance of the meaning and import of “fiduciary duty” for the responsibilities of those who make investment-related decisions on behalf of others – “decision-makers” – especially institutional investors, including pension funds. Focus on the subject is animated by the impact of such decisions on those ostensibly to be benefited by them. However, it has also been spurred by concern about how decision-makers’ choices bear upon the behaviors of the enterprises in which they invest and diverse stakeholders in the enterprise and the larger society. Here we largely attend to beneficiaries although we will in some measure address distinct but related concerns of others.

We consider decision-makers for funded employment-based defined benefit plans (“plans”) in the United States and the interests they might legitimately seek to advance. Plans promise workers – and sometimes their spousal survivors – a lifetime income starting at retirement – a “pension.” We refer to as “members” those who potentially qualify for a pension by virtue of their or their spouse’s employment at the enterprise with which the plan is associated. To assure that the promises are kept, workers’ and/or employers’ contributions to the plan are pooled and invested. Plans, like other retirement schemes, are usually subsidized by tax credits and/or deductions for contributions made and no or lower taxation of investment returns and/or plan payouts after retirement.