While dealing with the issue at the heart of this paper a fundamental question has to be tackled in greater depth: is the right to access to the Internet a human right (or a fundamental right: below is my attempt to introduce a terminological clarification in this regard) which enjoys a semantic, conceptual and constitutional autonomy? In other words, is access to the Internet an autonomous right or only a precondition for enjoying, among others, freedom of expression? Why does the classification as a free-standing or derived right matter? Does it carry normative implications or is it primarily a rhetorical tool? In trying to answer those questions, it may perhaps be beneficial to resist the temptation to rely on a “rhetoric” of fundamental rights and human rights, which is widespread throughout the various debates concerning the relationship between law and technology after the rise of the Internet. The language of rights (especially new rights) in Internet law is more than (rhetorically) appealing.