Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of contributors
- Foreword
- Why a handbook on human dignity?
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Human dignity from a legal perspective
- 2 Human dignity: concepts, discussions, philosophical perspectives
- Part I Origins of the concept in European history
- Part II Beyond the scope of the European tradition
- Part III Systematic conceptualization
- 19 Social and cultural presuppositions for the use of the concept of human dignity
- 20 Is human dignity the ground of human rights?
- 21 Human dignity: can a historical foundation alone suffice? From Joas’ affirmative genealogy to Kierkegaard's leap of faith
- 22 Kantian perspectives on the rational basis of human dignity
- 23 Kantian dignity: a critique
- 24 Human dignity and human rights in Alan Gewirth's moral philosophy
- 25 Human dignity in the capability approach
- 26 Human dignity in Catholic thought
- 27 Jacques Maritain's personalist conception of human dignity
- 28 Scheler and human dignity
- 29 Dignity and the Other: dignity and the phenomenological tradition
- 30 Dignity, fragility, singularity in Paul Ricœur's ethics
- 31 Human dignity as universal nobility
- 32 Dignity in the ubuntu tradition
- 33 Posthuman dignity
- 34 Dignity as the right to have rights: human dignity in Hannah Arendt
- 35 Individual and collective dignity
- Part IV Legal implementation
- Part V Conflicts and violence
- Part VI Contexts of justice
- Part VII Biology and bioethics
- Appendix 1 Further reading
- Appendix 2 Universal Declaration of Human Rights
- Index
- References
19 - Social and cultural presuppositions for the use of the concept of human dignity
from Part III - Systematic conceptualization
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 March 2015
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of contributors
- Foreword
- Why a handbook on human dignity?
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Human dignity from a legal perspective
- 2 Human dignity: concepts, discussions, philosophical perspectives
- Part I Origins of the concept in European history
- Part II Beyond the scope of the European tradition
- Part III Systematic conceptualization
- 19 Social and cultural presuppositions for the use of the concept of human dignity
- 20 Is human dignity the ground of human rights?
- 21 Human dignity: can a historical foundation alone suffice? From Joas’ affirmative genealogy to Kierkegaard's leap of faith
- 22 Kantian perspectives on the rational basis of human dignity
- 23 Kantian dignity: a critique
- 24 Human dignity and human rights in Alan Gewirth's moral philosophy
- 25 Human dignity in the capability approach
- 26 Human dignity in Catholic thought
- 27 Jacques Maritain's personalist conception of human dignity
- 28 Scheler and human dignity
- 29 Dignity and the Other: dignity and the phenomenological tradition
- 30 Dignity, fragility, singularity in Paul Ricœur's ethics
- 31 Human dignity as universal nobility
- 32 Dignity in the ubuntu tradition
- 33 Posthuman dignity
- 34 Dignity as the right to have rights: human dignity in Hannah Arendt
- 35 Individual and collective dignity
- Part IV Legal implementation
- Part V Conflicts and violence
- Part VI Contexts of justice
- Part VII Biology and bioethics
- Appendix 1 Further reading
- Appendix 2 Universal Declaration of Human Rights
- Index
- References
Summary
From a sociological point of view, human dignity is to be grasped as a societal phenomenon, the analysis of which is concerned with identifying the historical circumstances for the emergence of the concept of human dignity. The assumption that every living human being is ‘born free and equal in dignity and rights’ is understood as a normative social institution. In other words, from a sociological perspective, human dignity is conceived as a structural feature of modern societies, which are characterized by functional differentiation. The latter is either defined by an advanced division of labour (Durkheim 1930), or by the idea that there are diverse thematic fields of communication such as science, politics, law, economy, family etc., that are all assumed to be structured by different patterns of action/communication (Luhmann 1997). Functional differentiation requires that human beings recognize each other as individuals who are able to follow different patterns of action/communication. As individuals they are expected to be able to act not only as a scientist, but also as a mother, a shareholder or a member of a political party etc. The role of expectations within different realms of action are diverse and even contradictory and it is up to the individual to manage this complexity. Emile Durkheim (1950) argued that such societies first evolved in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in Europe and North America, a thesis that was subsequently developed further by Niklas Luhmann (1965). According to Durkheim and Luhmann, the structure of functional differentiation demands that there be individuals whose dignity is recognized. This idea forms the current basis of sociological reasoning on human dignity (Verschraegen 2002; Joas 2008; Lindemann 2010a).
If each single member of the human family is assumed to be born free and equal in dignity and rights, identifying someone as a member of the human family serves as a generally valid criterion for delimiting the circle of those beings that have to be recognized as beings with dignity. Two questions arise with regard to this premise: (1) Do sociological accounts offer a description of how the subject of human dignity is identified? In other words, how did the idea of one human family consisting of equal members arise? (2) How does sociology understand the meaning of the predicate ‘human dignity’? In other words, what does it mean to say that each member is equally endowed with inalienable human dignity?
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The Cambridge Handbook of Human DignityInterdisciplinary Perspectives, pp. 191 - 199Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2014
References
- 5
- Cited by