A critical comment on the ascription of dignity to non-human living beings

Should dignity be ascribed only to humans or also to non-human living beings? We are faced with this problem if we take note of a recent bioethical discussion about the ‘dignity of creatures’. This discussion was prompted by an amendment to the Swiss Federal Constitution. A plebiscite of May 1992 had voted into the Constitution that the federal government in its regulations of gene technologies shall take into account the dignity of non-human creatures, that is: of animals, plants and other organisms. The vote for the demand that the dignity of these creatures be taken into account indicates that wide sections of the Swiss population worried about moral problems caused by genetic engineering – in short: whether human beings have a moral obligation to set limits to their interference with the life of animals, plants and other organisms, and, if so, which limits should be set. Hitherto used moral criteria, such as the avoidance of pain and suffering in animals, were thought insufficient for tackling these problems. A more far-reaching criterion was deemed necessary in order to include moral concerns beyond animal pain and suffering. But the fierce debate following the plebiscite showed that it is far from clear what moral content the concept of dignity of non-human creatures should be taken to have. The Swiss authorities commissioned two teams to clarify the concept and to explore its implications for the genetic engineering of non-human creatures. The reports of the teams give expression to two interpretations of the concept that were prevailing in the discussion (Schmidt 2008: 196). The first report (Praetorius and Saladin 1996) tries to determine a concept of dignity of non-human creatures by analogy with a Kantian concept of human dignity. The second report (Balzer, Rippe and Schaber 1998) suggests that the concept should be seen as corresponding with the concept of inherent value of non-human beings. I will describe both interpretations and criticize them for what I take to be their problematic features. Finally, I will raise the question of whether we should ascribe dignity to all living beings or only to human persons, bearing in mind the role of the concept of dignity as a ground for human rights.