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from Part III - Systematic conceptualization
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 March 2015
Both in his approach to ethics and in his treatment of concrete cases as matters of ‘practical wisdom’, Paul Ricœur has developed a distinctive position towards grounding and specifying what is called ‘human dignity’ in Kant. It appears in references to what is ‘above all price’, using Kant's term for indicating what is not at our disposition since it is the foundation, not the object of our autonomy (Ricœur 2005: 237). The reference to dignity is not made explicit, but is present in examples of its denial which give rise to the moral feeling of ‘indignation’, and in identifying the limit of tolerance in what is ‘intolerable’ (Ricœur 1996: 198–9). While it does not belong to the terms that are subjected to an analysis of the philosophical problems contained in them, such as ‘autonomy’ and ‘imputability’, it is given a place of immediate evidence:
[I]n Kant himself, the subjective side of imputation relies on moral feelings that constitute what he called the rational motives of action. Only one motive, only one reason is considered by Kant: respect. One of the tasks of moral philosophy today would be to enlarge, to expand, the field of moral feelings concerning shame, courage, admiration, enthusiasm, veneration, indignation. These feelings have to do with dignity, a kind of immediate recognition of the dignity of a moral subject.
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