Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of contributors
- Foreword
- Why a handbook on human dignity?
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Human dignity from a legal perspective
- 2 Human dignity: concepts, discussions, philosophical perspectives
- Part I Origins of the concept in European history
- Part II Beyond the scope of the European tradition
- Part III Systematic conceptualization
- 19 Social and cultural presuppositions for the use of the concept of human dignity
- 20 Is human dignity the ground of human rights?
- 21 Human dignity: can a historical foundation alone suffice? From Joas’ affirmative genealogy to Kierkegaard's leap of faith
- 22 Kantian perspectives on the rational basis of human dignity
- 23 Kantian dignity: a critique
- 24 Human dignity and human rights in Alan Gewirth's moral philosophy
- 25 Human dignity in the capability approach
- 26 Human dignity in Catholic thought
- 27 Jacques Maritain's personalist conception of human dignity
- 28 Scheler and human dignity
- 29 Dignity and the Other: dignity and the phenomenological tradition
- 30 Dignity, fragility, singularity in Paul Ricœur's ethics
- 31 Human dignity as universal nobility
- 32 Dignity in the ubuntu tradition
- 33 Posthuman dignity
- 34 Dignity as the right to have rights: human dignity in Hannah Arendt
- 35 Individual and collective dignity
- Part IV Legal implementation
- Part V Conflicts and violence
- Part VI Contexts of justice
- Part VII Biology and bioethics
- Appendix 1 Further reading
- Appendix 2 Universal Declaration of Human Rights
- Index
- References
30 - Dignity, fragility, singularity in Paul Ricœur's ethics
from Part III - Systematic conceptualization
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 March 2015
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of contributors
- Foreword
- Why a handbook on human dignity?
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Human dignity from a legal perspective
- 2 Human dignity: concepts, discussions, philosophical perspectives
- Part I Origins of the concept in European history
- Part II Beyond the scope of the European tradition
- Part III Systematic conceptualization
- 19 Social and cultural presuppositions for the use of the concept of human dignity
- 20 Is human dignity the ground of human rights?
- 21 Human dignity: can a historical foundation alone suffice? From Joas’ affirmative genealogy to Kierkegaard's leap of faith
- 22 Kantian perspectives on the rational basis of human dignity
- 23 Kantian dignity: a critique
- 24 Human dignity and human rights in Alan Gewirth's moral philosophy
- 25 Human dignity in the capability approach
- 26 Human dignity in Catholic thought
- 27 Jacques Maritain's personalist conception of human dignity
- 28 Scheler and human dignity
- 29 Dignity and the Other: dignity and the phenomenological tradition
- 30 Dignity, fragility, singularity in Paul Ricœur's ethics
- 31 Human dignity as universal nobility
- 32 Dignity in the ubuntu tradition
- 33 Posthuman dignity
- 34 Dignity as the right to have rights: human dignity in Hannah Arendt
- 35 Individual and collective dignity
- Part IV Legal implementation
- Part V Conflicts and violence
- Part VI Contexts of justice
- Part VII Biology and bioethics
- Appendix 1 Further reading
- Appendix 2 Universal Declaration of Human Rights
- Index
- References
Summary
Both in his approach to ethics and in his treatment of concrete cases as matters of ‘practical wisdom’, Paul Ricœur has developed a distinctive position towards grounding and specifying what is called ‘human dignity’ in Kant. It appears in references to what is ‘above all price’, using Kant's term for indicating what is not at our disposition since it is the foundation, not the object of our autonomy (Ricœur 2005: 237). The reference to dignity is not made explicit, but is present in examples of its denial which give rise to the moral feeling of ‘indignation’, and in identifying the limit of tolerance in what is ‘intolerable’ (Ricœur 1996: 198–9). While it does not belong to the terms that are subjected to an analysis of the philosophical problems contained in them, such as ‘autonomy’ and ‘imputability’, it is given a place of immediate evidence:
[I]n Kant himself, the subjective side of imputation relies on moral feelings that constitute what he called the rational motives of action. Only one motive, only one reason is considered by Kant: respect. One of the tasks of moral philosophy today would be to enlarge, to expand, the field of moral feelings concerning shame, courage, admiration, enthusiasm, veneration, indignation. These feelings have to do with dignity, a kind of immediate recognition of the dignity of a moral subject.
(Ricœur 2002: 287)- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The Cambridge Handbook of Human DignityInterdisciplinary Perspectives, pp. 286 - 297Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2014
References
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