Book contents
- The Cambridge Handbook of Constitutional Theory
- The Cambridge Handbook of Constitutional Theory
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Contributors
- Frontispiece
- Preface and Acknowledgements
- 1 Introduction
- Part I Values
- Part II Modalities
- 10 Impartiality
- 11 Constitutional Legitimacy
- 12 Sovereignty
- 13 Constituent Power
- 14 Representation
- 15 Deliberation
- 16 Opposition
- 17 The Separation of Powers
- 18 The Rule of Law
- 19 Constitutional Conventions
- 20 Secularism
- 21 Constitutional Review
- 22 Constitutional Interpretation
- 23 Proportionality
- 24 Civil Disobedience
- 25 Constitutional Entrenchment
- 26 Emergency Powers
- 27 Regulation
- 28 Cost–Benefit Analysis
- 29 Revolution
- Part III Institutions
- Part IV Challenges for Constitutional Democracy
- Bibliography
- Index
- References
12 - Sovereignty
from Part II - Modalities
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 27 March 2025
- The Cambridge Handbook of Constitutional Theory
- The Cambridge Handbook of Constitutional Theory
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Contributors
- Frontispiece
- Preface and Acknowledgements
- 1 Introduction
- Part I Values
- Part II Modalities
- 10 Impartiality
- 11 Constitutional Legitimacy
- 12 Sovereignty
- 13 Constituent Power
- 14 Representation
- 15 Deliberation
- 16 Opposition
- 17 The Separation of Powers
- 18 The Rule of Law
- 19 Constitutional Conventions
- 20 Secularism
- 21 Constitutional Review
- 22 Constitutional Interpretation
- 23 Proportionality
- 24 Civil Disobedience
- 25 Constitutional Entrenchment
- 26 Emergency Powers
- 27 Regulation
- 28 Cost–Benefit Analysis
- 29 Revolution
- Part III Institutions
- Part IV Challenges for Constitutional Democracy
- Bibliography
- Index
- References
Summary
Hobbes posed for modernity what we can think of as the puzzle – even the paradox – of sovereignty. The sovereign of a particular polity is the person or body who wields ultimate authority to make law. It follows, he claimed, that the sovereign is legally unlimited. But for Hobbes, any sovereign is legally constituted in that it must comply with what I call the ‘validity mark’ of sovereignty: Legal change must happen in accordance with the criteria of validity. In addition, there is the ‘fundamental legality mark’: To count as an act of sovereign will, a law must be consistent with the laws of nature, in more contemporary terms with the fundamental legal commitments of the legal order. Hobbes’s idea of sovereignty is thus a legal idea, which contrasts with the figure that haunts politics today, the ‘political idea of sovereignty’. I argue that in order to properly oppose the troubling figure of the political sovereign, one needs to have in place not only both marks of sovereignty, but also a political theory of their value. There is a politics to the legal idea of sovereignty.
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- The Cambridge Handbook of Constitutional Theory , pp. 192 - 207Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2025