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23 - Proportionality

from Part II - Modalities

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 March 2025

Richard Bellamy
Affiliation:
University College London
Jeff King
Affiliation:
University College London
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Summary

Constitutions set out fundamental principles of political morality that bind institutional action and assign strong political rights to individuals. At surface level, the principle of proportionality is a methodological device. It operates as a doctrinal heading under which courts scrutinize state interference with individual liberty and assess the scope of their own authority. According to the orthodox understanding of proportionality, this scrutiny takes the form of balancing rights against public interest, which raises questions about the legitimacy of judicial review. This chapter argues that, contrary to the orthodox view, proportionality is primarily about the normative foundations of constitutional rights and the duty of courts to pursue, through principled legal reasoning, the moral truth about individual rights. On this rival account of proportionality, rights are equality-based moral norms constraining state action and no actual balancing takes place by courts. If we are to take seriously both the idea of fundamental rights and the principle of proportionality, we must abandon the misleading metaphor of balancing and the problems of incommensurability and judicial scepticism to which it leads.

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Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2025

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References

Recommended Reading

Alexy, R. (2002). A Theory of Constitutional Rights, Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
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Huscroft, G., Miller, B. W., & Webber, G. eds., (2014). Proportionality and the Rule of Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Jackson, V. & Tushnet, M. (2017). Proportionality: New Frontiers, New Challenges, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Klatt, M. & Meister, M., (2012). The Constitutional Structure of Proportionality, Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
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Letsas, G. (2015). Rescuing Proportionality. In Cruft, R., Liao, S., Renzo, M., eds., Philosophical Foundations of Human Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Letsas, G. (2018). Proportionality as Fittingness. Current Legal Problems, 71(1), 5386.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lever, A. (2020). A Sense of Proportion: Some Thoughts on Equality, Security and Justice. Res Publica, 26(4), 357371.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Möller, Kai. (2012). The Global Model of Constitutional Rights, Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
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Poole, T. (2010). Proportionality in Perspective. New Zealand Law Review, 2010 (2), 369391.Google Scholar
Ripstein, A. (2016). Reclaiming Proportionality. Journal of Applied Philosophy, 22(2), 2431.Google Scholar
Tsakyrakis, S. (2009). Proportionality: An Assault on Human Rights? International Journal of Constitutional Law, 7(3), 468493.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
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  • Proportionality
  • Edited by Richard Bellamy, University College London, Jeff King, University College London
  • Book: The Cambridge Handbook of Constitutional Theory
  • Online publication: 27 March 2025
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108868143.026
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  • Proportionality
  • Edited by Richard Bellamy, University College London, Jeff King, University College London
  • Book: The Cambridge Handbook of Constitutional Theory
  • Online publication: 27 March 2025
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108868143.026
Available formats
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Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Proportionality
  • Edited by Richard Bellamy, University College London, Jeff King, University College London
  • Book: The Cambridge Handbook of Constitutional Theory
  • Online publication: 27 March 2025
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108868143.026
Available formats
×