Book contents
- The Cambridge Handbook of Constitutional Theory
- The Cambridge Handbook of Constitutional Theory
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Contributors
- Frontispiece
- Preface and Acknowledgements
- 1 Introduction
- Part I Values
- Part II Modalities
- 10 Impartiality
- 11 Constitutional Legitimacy
- 12 Sovereignty
- 13 Constituent Power
- 14 Representation
- 15 Deliberation
- 16 Opposition
- 17 The Separation of Powers
- 18 The Rule of Law
- 19 Constitutional Conventions
- 20 Secularism
- 21 Constitutional Review
- 22 Constitutional Interpretation
- 23 Proportionality
- 24 Civil Disobedience
- 25 Constitutional Entrenchment
- 26 Emergency Powers
- 27 Regulation
- 28 Cost–Benefit Analysis
- 29 Revolution
- Part III Institutions
- Part IV Challenges for Constitutional Democracy
- Bibliography
- Index
- References
26 - Emergency Powers
from Part II - Modalities
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 27 March 2025
By
Book contents
- The Cambridge Handbook of Constitutional Theory
- The Cambridge Handbook of Constitutional Theory
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Contributors
- Frontispiece
- Preface and Acknowledgements
- 1 Introduction
- Part I Values
- Part II Modalities
- 10 Impartiality
- 11 Constitutional Legitimacy
- 12 Sovereignty
- 13 Constituent Power
- 14 Representation
- 15 Deliberation
- 16 Opposition
- 17 The Separation of Powers
- 18 The Rule of Law
- 19 Constitutional Conventions
- 20 Secularism
- 21 Constitutional Review
- 22 Constitutional Interpretation
- 23 Proportionality
- 24 Civil Disobedience
- 25 Constitutional Entrenchment
- 26 Emergency Powers
- 27 Regulation
- 28 Cost–Benefit Analysis
- 29 Revolution
- Part III Institutions
- Part IV Challenges for Constitutional Democracy
- Bibliography
- Index
- References
Summary
Rather than occasions for law’s standstill in face of a political decision, emergencies are opportunities for legal, institutional and normative mobilization. The entry lays out the field’s basic areas of concern: the theoretical problem of containment of threats within a particular legal and political order, and the practical problems of definitions, authorizations, jurisdiction and temporality. If indeed the time frames of emergency are long and flexible, multiple and overlapping rather than “exceptional”, then law in emergencies is a constantly shifting space of opportunity in which normatively charged political projects can be manifested. To design legal and constitutional mechanisms that will better respond to threats, we should shift away from theories that perpetuate a static dichotomy between “norm” and “exception”, and study emergency as a dynamic field of legal and normative mobilization.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The Cambridge Handbook of Constitutional Theory , pp. 433 - 450Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2025
References
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