Book contents
- The Cambridge Handbook of Constitutional Theory
- The Cambridge Handbook of Constitutional Theory
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Contributors
- Frontispiece
- Preface and Acknowledgements
- 1 Introduction
- Part I Values
- Part II Modalities
- 10 Impartiality
- 11 Constitutional Legitimacy
- 12 Sovereignty
- 13 Constituent Power
- 14 Representation
- 15 Deliberation
- 16 Opposition
- 17 The Separation of Powers
- 18 The Rule of Law
- 19 Constitutional Conventions
- 20 Secularism
- 21 Constitutional Review
- 22 Constitutional Interpretation
- 23 Proportionality
- 24 Civil Disobedience
- 25 Constitutional Entrenchment
- 26 Emergency Powers
- 27 Regulation
- 28 Cost–Benefit Analysis
- 29 Revolution
- Part III Institutions
- Part IV Challenges for Constitutional Democracy
- Bibliography
- Index
- References
25 - Constitutional Entrenchment
from Part II - Modalities
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 27 March 2025
By
Book contents
- The Cambridge Handbook of Constitutional Theory
- The Cambridge Handbook of Constitutional Theory
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Contributors
- Frontispiece
- Preface and Acknowledgements
- 1 Introduction
- Part I Values
- Part II Modalities
- 10 Impartiality
- 11 Constitutional Legitimacy
- 12 Sovereignty
- 13 Constituent Power
- 14 Representation
- 15 Deliberation
- 16 Opposition
- 17 The Separation of Powers
- 18 The Rule of Law
- 19 Constitutional Conventions
- 20 Secularism
- 21 Constitutional Review
- 22 Constitutional Interpretation
- 23 Proportionality
- 24 Civil Disobedience
- 25 Constitutional Entrenchment
- 26 Emergency Powers
- 27 Regulation
- 28 Cost–Benefit Analysis
- 29 Revolution
- Part III Institutions
- Part IV Challenges for Constitutional Democracy
- Bibliography
- Index
- References
Summary
Entrenchment is a constitutional tool that renders legal change more difficult. This chapter examines the forms entrenchment can take, and the reasons for and against entrenchment. It argues that entrenchment can, on occasion, help resolve constitutional problems by requiring law-making institutions to depart from the normal way in which they effect legal change. Entrenchment rules are at their most attractive where there is a connection between the reason for entrenchment – the reason why the normal rules of legal change are problematic in a particular area of law – the type of entrenchment rule adopted, and the area of law entrenched.
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- Information
- The Cambridge Handbook of Constitutional Theory , pp. 417 - 432Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2025
References
Recommended Reading
Albert, R. (2010). Constitutional Handcuffs. Arizona State Law Review, 42 (3), 664–716.Google Scholar
Albert, R. (2014). The Structure of Constitutional Amendment Rules. Wake Forest L. R., 49, 913.Google Scholar
Eule, J. N. (1987). Temporal Limits on the Legislative Mandate: Entrenchment and Retroactivity. Law and Social Enquiry, 12 (2–3), 381–459.Google Scholar
Levinson, D. J. (2011). Parchment and Politics: The Positive Puzzle of Constitutional Commitment. Harvard Law Review, 124 (3), 657–746.Google Scholar
Marshall, G. (1987). Constitutional Conventions, Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Posner, E. & Vermeule, A. (2002). Legislative Entrenchment: A Reappraisal. Yale Law Journal, 111 (7), 1165–1706.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Schwartzberg, M. (2014). Counting the Many: The Origins and Limits of the Supermajority Rule, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar