Book contents
- The Cambridge Handbook of Constitutional Theory
- The Cambridge Handbook of Constitutional Theory
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Contributors
- Frontispiece
- Preface and Acknowledgements
- 1 Introduction
- Part I Values
- Part II Modalities
- 10 Impartiality
- 11 Constitutional Legitimacy
- 12 Sovereignty
- 13 Constituent Power
- 14 Representation
- 15 Deliberation
- 16 Opposition
- 17 The Separation of Powers
- 18 The Rule of Law
- 19 Constitutional Conventions
- 20 Secularism
- 21 Constitutional Review
- 22 Constitutional Interpretation
- 23 Proportionality
- 24 Civil Disobedience
- 25 Constitutional Entrenchment
- 26 Emergency Powers
- 27 Regulation
- 28 Cost–Benefit Analysis
- 29 Revolution
- Part III Institutions
- Part IV Challenges for Constitutional Democracy
- Bibliography
- Index
- References
19 - Constitutional Conventions
from Part II - Modalities
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 27 March 2025
By
Book contents
- The Cambridge Handbook of Constitutional Theory
- The Cambridge Handbook of Constitutional Theory
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Contributors
- Frontispiece
- Preface and Acknowledgements
- 1 Introduction
- Part I Values
- Part II Modalities
- 10 Impartiality
- 11 Constitutional Legitimacy
- 12 Sovereignty
- 13 Constituent Power
- 14 Representation
- 15 Deliberation
- 16 Opposition
- 17 The Separation of Powers
- 18 The Rule of Law
- 19 Constitutional Conventions
- 20 Secularism
- 21 Constitutional Review
- 22 Constitutional Interpretation
- 23 Proportionality
- 24 Civil Disobedience
- 25 Constitutional Entrenchment
- 26 Emergency Powers
- 27 Regulation
- 28 Cost–Benefit Analysis
- 29 Revolution
- Part III Institutions
- Part IV Challenges for Constitutional Democracy
- Bibliography
- Index
- References
Summary
The chapter considers unwritten constitutional conventions (CCs). They are best known from Westminster systems, where they are embedded in ordinary jurisprudence. They can also be identified in the United States, France (both in the ancien régime and today), and Norway. In these countries their existence and causal efficacy can be shown by historical and current practices. The aim of the chapter is positive (explanatory), not normative. It discusses how CCs arise and evolve and the mechanisms by which they influence decision-makers.
Keywords
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- The Cambridge Handbook of Constitutional Theory , pp. 316 - 332Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2025
References
Recommended Reading
Avril, P. (1997). Les conventions de la constitution, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Blick, A. (2015). Constitutional Reform. In B. Galligan, & S. Brenton, eds., Constitutional Conventions in Westminster Systems. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 249–260.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bryce, J. (1915). The American Commonwealth, reprint Indiana: Indianapolis: Liberty Fund 1995.Google Scholar
Cooray, L. J. M. (1979). Conventions. The Australian Constitution and the Future, Sydney: Legal Books.Google Scholar
Dicey, A. V. (1915). Introduction to the study of the law of the constitution, 8th edn., London: Macmillan and Co.Google Scholar
Heard, A. (1989). Recognizing the Variety Among Constitutional Conventions. Canadian Journal of Political Science, 22 (1), 63–82.CrossRefGoogle Scholar