Book contents
- The Cambridge Handbook of Constitutional Theory
- The Cambridge Handbook of Constitutional Theory
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Contributors
- Frontispiece
- Preface and Acknowledgements
- 1 Introduction
- Part I Values
- Part II Modalities
- Part III Institutions
- Part III. A The State
- 30 The State
- 31 The Material Constitution
- 32 Federalism
- 33 Consociationalism
- 34 Corporatism
- 35 Guarantor (or the So-called “Fourth Branch”) Institutions
- 36 Central Banks
- Part III. B The Executive
- Part III. C The Democratic System
- Part III D The Legal System
- Part III E The Global System
- Part IV Challenges for Constitutional Democracy
- Bibliography
- Index
- References
33 - Consociationalism
from Part III. A - The State
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 27 March 2025
- The Cambridge Handbook of Constitutional Theory
- The Cambridge Handbook of Constitutional Theory
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Contributors
- Frontispiece
- Preface and Acknowledgements
- 1 Introduction
- Part I Values
- Part II Modalities
- Part III Institutions
- Part III. A The State
- 30 The State
- 31 The Material Constitution
- 32 Federalism
- 33 Consociationalism
- 34 Corporatism
- 35 Guarantor (or the So-called “Fourth Branch”) Institutions
- 36 Central Banks
- Part III. B The Executive
- Part III. C The Democratic System
- Part III D The Legal System
- Part III E The Global System
- Part IV Challenges for Constitutional Democracy
- Bibliography
- Index
- References
Summary
Consociationalism is a distinct regime-type that is designed to deal with the problem of deep diversity, that is, a society divided by differences that are salient enough to consistently polarise groups over time in ways that makes governing together difficult. The defining goal of consociational regimes is social and political stability in a manner consistent with democratic values. The unifying feature of the various measures advocated to achieve that goal is the protection of salient social groups (or segments) from blunt majority rule, especially in areas of particular concern for those groups. But can consociational regimes become sufficiently stable over time? The way in which recognition tends to be prioritised in consociations above other democratic values, we argue, results in democratic deficits that provide resources to actors who would seek to challenge the regime from within. This observation serves as the basis of our claim that consociations are inherently unstable in the sense that they face the permanent risk of evolving into regimes dominated by the majority or into a spiral of progressive disintegration. Without making prescriptions, this conclusion leads us to briefly consider an alternative to consociationalism as a solution to the problem of deep diversity, namely centripetalism.
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- The Cambridge Handbook of Constitutional Theory , pp. 568 - 584Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2025