Book contents
- The Cambridge Handbook of Compliance
- The Cambridge Handbook of Compliance
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Contributors
- 1 Introduction: Compliance as the Interaction between Rules and Behavior
- Part I Compliance Concepts and Approaches
- Part II Deterrence and Incapacitation
- Part III Incentives
- Part IV Legitimacy and Social Norms
- Part V Capacity and Opportunity
- Part VI Compliance and Cognition
- Part VII Management and Organizational Processes
- Part VIII Measuring and Evaluating Compliance
- Part IX Analysis of Particular Fields
- 55 Strengthening Tax Compliance by Balancing Authorities’ Power and Trustworthiness
- 56 Compliance in Occupational Safety and Health
- 57 Intellectual Property Compliance: Systematic Methods for Building and Using Intellectual Property
- 58 Insider Trading Compliance Programs
- 59 Antitrust Compliance: Collusion
- 60 Understanding AI Collusion and Compliance
- 61 HIPAA Compliance
- 62 Biopharmaceutical Compliance
- 63 Transnational Anti-Bribery Law
- 64 Data Security, Data Breaches, and Compliance
- 65 Doping in Sports: A Compliance Conundrum
- 66 Food Safety Compliance
- 67 Global Supply Chain Auditing
- 68 Corporations, Human Rights and Compliance
- 69 Aiming for Integrity with Integrity
- References
59 - Antitrust Compliance: Collusion
from Part IX - Analysis of Particular Fields
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 07 May 2021
Book contents
- The Cambridge Handbook of Compliance
- The Cambridge Handbook of Compliance
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Contributors
- 1 Introduction: Compliance as the Interaction between Rules and Behavior
- Part I Compliance Concepts and Approaches
- Part II Deterrence and Incapacitation
- Part III Incentives
- Part IV Legitimacy and Social Norms
- Part V Capacity and Opportunity
- Part VI Compliance and Cognition
- Part VII Management and Organizational Processes
- Part VIII Measuring and Evaluating Compliance
- Part IX Analysis of Particular Fields
- 55 Strengthening Tax Compliance by Balancing Authorities’ Power and Trustworthiness
- 56 Compliance in Occupational Safety and Health
- 57 Intellectual Property Compliance: Systematic Methods for Building and Using Intellectual Property
- 58 Insider Trading Compliance Programs
- 59 Antitrust Compliance: Collusion
- 60 Understanding AI Collusion and Compliance
- 61 HIPAA Compliance
- 62 Biopharmaceutical Compliance
- 63 Transnational Anti-Bribery Law
- 64 Data Security, Data Breaches, and Compliance
- 65 Doping in Sports: A Compliance Conundrum
- 66 Food Safety Compliance
- 67 Global Supply Chain Auditing
- 68 Corporations, Human Rights and Compliance
- 69 Aiming for Integrity with Integrity
- References
Summary
Abstract: Focusing on collusive behavior, this chapter outlines the complexity associated with both the ex ante design of antitrust compliance programs and the ex post assessment of their impact. Following an interdisciplinary review of relevant literature, the chapter provides a structured cost–benefit approach to compliance and challenges the idea that compliance cannot be rationalized. We recognize that measurement of compliance programs may be particularly difficult in light of the importance of less-tangible factors such as corporate culture. Yet, the chapter proposes that a principled approach to compliance would considerably support the work of practitioners. Future research should concentrate on studying the interaction effects of compliance mechanisms and corporate culture. Such large-scale empirical studies on individual and firm-specific factors of compliance might be promoted and coordinated by competition authorities.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The Cambridge Handbook of Compliance , pp. 868 - 880Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2021
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