Book contents
- The Cambridge Economic History of the Modern World
- The Cambridge Economic Historyof the Modern World
- The Cambridge Economic History of the Modern World
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Contributors to Volume II
- Introduction to Volume II
- Part I Regional Developments
- Part II Factors Governing Differential Outcomes in the Global Economy
- 12 Healthy, Literate, and Smart
- 13 Proximate Sources of Growth
- 14 Underlying Sources of Growth
- 15 Underlying Sources of Growth
- 16 Living Standards, Inequality, and Human Development
- 17 Trade and Immigration
- 18 International Finance
- 19 War and Empire
- Index
- References
15 - Underlying Sources of Growth
Institutions and the State
from Part II - Factors Governing Differential Outcomes in the Global Economy
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 03 June 2021
- The Cambridge Economic History of the Modern World
- The Cambridge Economic Historyof the Modern World
- The Cambridge Economic History of the Modern World
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Contributors to Volume II
- Introduction to Volume II
- Part I Regional Developments
- Part II Factors Governing Differential Outcomes in the Global Economy
- 12 Healthy, Literate, and Smart
- 13 Proximate Sources of Growth
- 14 Underlying Sources of Growth
- 15 Underlying Sources of Growth
- 16 Living Standards, Inequality, and Human Development
- 17 Trade and Immigration
- 18 International Finance
- 19 War and Empire
- Index
- References
Summary
This chapter explains how and why democracy, capitalism, and wealth have been correlated since 1870. It uses broadly the North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009) framework to demonstrate that representative political institutions and ready access to incorporation or similar enterprise forms have been mutually reinforcing and conducive to high living standards, widely shared. But linear development or convergence towards such ‘open access’ societies cannot be taken for granted. History suggests that the existence of workably attractive capitalist democracies is unlikely to prevent nationalist, revolutionary, and populist leaders continuing to fashion alternatives, whether by force or by democratic debate.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The Cambridge Economic History of the Modern World , pp. 418 - 441Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2021