This chapter argues for the following claims. (1) There is no content that groups the propositions of common sense together. (2) The common-sense grouping has a real purpose: it delineates propositions that we are at a very minimum justified in believing. (3) Common-sense propositions are to be found at the intersection of not-science-based yet widely held beliefs, beliefs not based on testimony or inference, and beliefs whose denials are pragmatically incoherent. (4) Commonsensicality is a graded concept: there are degrees in which propositions are propositions of common sense. (5) Propositions of common sense are objects of at least one of the following attitudes: belief, disposition to believe, or taking for granted in the sense of presupposing them, either as a justification-conferring presupposition or as a pragmatic presupposition. (6) Although we can give up common-sense propositions, we should only do so in the face of very weighty evidence.