Book contents
- The Cambridge Companion to Common-Sense Philosophy
- Other Volumes in the Series of Cambridge Companions
- The Cambridge Companion to Common-Sense Philosophy
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Contributors
- Introduction: Why Common Sense Matters
- Part I
- Part II
- 7 The Delineation of Common Sense
- 8 Common Sense in Metaphysics
- 9 Common-Sense Realism
- 10 The Epistemic Authority of Common Sense
- 11 Scepticism and Certainty: Moore and Wittgenstein on Common Sense and Philosophy
- 12 Morality and Common Sense
- 13 Common Sense and Ontological Commitment
- 14 The Tension between Scientific Knowledge and Common-Sense Philosophy
- 15 A Scientific-Realist Account of Common Sense
- References
- Index
- Other Volumes in the Series of Cambridge Companions
9 - Common-Sense Realism
from Part II
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 06 November 2020
- The Cambridge Companion to Common-Sense Philosophy
- Other Volumes in the Series of Cambridge Companions
- The Cambridge Companion to Common-Sense Philosophy
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Contributors
- Introduction: Why Common Sense Matters
- Part I
- Part II
- 7 The Delineation of Common Sense
- 8 Common Sense in Metaphysics
- 9 Common-Sense Realism
- 10 The Epistemic Authority of Common Sense
- 11 Scepticism and Certainty: Moore and Wittgenstein on Common Sense and Philosophy
- 12 Morality and Common Sense
- 13 Common Sense and Ontological Commitment
- 14 The Tension between Scientific Knowledge and Common-Sense Philosophy
- 15 A Scientific-Realist Account of Common Sense
- References
- Index
- Other Volumes in the Series of Cambridge Companions
Summary
A crucial methodological recourse in matters of deliberation and inquiry, common sense has a dual bearing. On the positive side, there is a strong pro-presumption that any answers we give to questions of policy and procedure shall incorporate and stand in confirmation with our common-sense beliefs on the matter. On the negative side, there is a strong con-presumption against any rejection or abandonment of common-sense beliefs, and a cogent justification should be provided for any step in this direction. Methodologically, the common-sense approach exerts a strong constraint on our procedures of explanation and validation. This chapter explores how we should think of methodology in common-sense philosophy. Common sense is neither a cognitive faculty nor a way of producing beliefs. A common-sense belief is not produced in a certain way but rather a particular sort of belief, that is, one that is available to people in general on account of its triteness, its palpable obviousness. A common-sense belief is pervasive among the members of a community on the basis of their shared experiences in managing everyday affairs. Common-sense beliefs address matters of everyday run-of-the-mill; they relate to what transpires within the sphere of the ordinary course of things in everyday life.
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- The Cambridge Companion to Common-Sense Philosophy , pp. 208 - 224Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2020