Aristotle’s Biological Metaphysics

doi:10.1017/9781108181792.008

Chapter 7 - Aristotle’s Biological Metaphysics

Published online by Cambridge University Press: 14 May 2021

Charlotte Witt

Edited by

Sophia M. Connell

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Sophia M. Connell: Affiliation:
Birkbeck College, University of London

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Summary

It is clear from his extensive biological writings that Aristotle was deeply interested in life, including a vast range of living things, their parts, lifestyles, life processes, and environments. How are life and living beings, extensively described and explained in the biological writings, reflected in Aristotle’s ontology, his understanding of being? My question is prompted in part by the fact that some of Aristotle’s most important metaphysical concepts apply equally to living beings (animals) and to non-living beings (artifacts). In this chapter I develop an account of the theoretical significance of life and living beings that focuses on Aristotle’s distinction between two ways of being developed in Metaphysics Book 9 – being potentially and being actively.

Keywords

natural beings artifacts ways of being being potentially being actively life

Type: Chapter
Information: The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle's Biology , pp. 114 - 126

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108181792.008 [Opens in a new window]

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Print publication year: 2021

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References

Guide to Further Reading

Katayama, E. G. 1999. Aristotle on Artifacts (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press).Google Scholar

Meikle, S. 1994. “Aristotle on Money,” Phronesis 39(1): 26–44.Google Scholar

Shields, C. 2008. “Substance and Life in Aristotle,” in J. Mouracade (ed.), “Aristotle on Life,” Apeiron 41(3): 129–152.Google Scholar

Witt, C. 2015a. “In Defense of the Craft Analogy: Artifacts and Natural Teleology,” in Leunissen, M. (ed.), Aristotle’s Physics: A Critical Guide (Cambridge University Press).Google Scholar

Witt, C. 2015b. “‘As If By Convention Alone’: The Unstable Ontology of Aristotle’s Ethics,” in Henry, D. and Nielsen, K. M. (eds.), Bridging The Gap Between Aristotle’s Science And Ethics (Cambridge University Press).Google Scholar

Beere, J. 2009. Doing and Being. An Interpretation of Aristotle’s Metaphysics Theta (Oxford University Press).Google Scholar

Kosman, A. 2013. The Activity of Being. An Essay on Aristotle’s Ontology (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press).CrossRef Google Scholar

Makin, S. 2006. Aristotle: Metaphysics Theta, translated with a commentary (Oxford: Clarendon Press).Google Scholar

Witt, C. 2003. Ways of Being in Aristotle: Potentiality and Actuality in Aristotle’s Metaphysics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press).Google Scholar

Connell, S. M. 2016. Aristotle on Female Animals: A Study of the Generation of Animals (Cambridge University Press).CrossRef Google Scholar

Frey, C. 2015. “From Blood to Flesh: Homonomy, Unity and Ways of Being in Aristotle,” Ancient Philosophy 35(2): 375–394.Google Scholar

Kosman, L. K. 1987. “Animals and Other Beings in Aristotle,” in Gotthelf, A. and Lennox, J. G. (eds.), Philosophical Issues in Aristotle’s Biology (Cambridge University Press).Google Scholar

Leunissen, M. 2010. Explanation and Teleology in Aristotle’s Science of Nature (Cambridge University Press).Google Scholar

Witt, C. 2012. “Aristotle on Deformed Animal Kinds,” Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 43: 83–106.Google Scholar