The problems associated with Bevin's imperial-driven ‘peasants, not pashas’ strategy were numerous, if not overwhelming. Without finance, without the experts, and without the goodwill and receptivity on the part of Middle East governments, Bevin's dreams of promoting a more socially just relationship between Britain and the region lay shattered. Imperial dreams may have died hard as we have seen, but it was inevitable that they would do so given the dynamics of the postwar world. Yet the small, seemingly insignificant core of Bevin's policy, the Development Division of the BMEO, remained in place – beleaguered, underfunded, undermanned, yet still in place. Indeed, if its regional reputation among certain British and Middle East officials by the end of the 1950s is anything to go by, it seemed that, in its own small way, the BMEO flourished. This success was recognized when Britain chose the example of the regionally located development division as the administrative model on which to base its global development programme inaugurated with the establishment of the Department of Technical Cooperation in 1961.

To understand why the seemingly insignificant BMEO retained such relative importance, one needs to change the parameters upon which one judges a development programme. If measured exclusively by inputs and outputs, by increases in GNP and the standard of living in the Middle East, the BMEO was of marginal significance although it did have some unqualified success stories, most notably in Jordan. If reappraised on its ability to generate local initiative and development, necessarily more gradual and incremental, then the work of the BMEO comes out looking more interesting.