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Conclusion

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 October 2011

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Summary

In August 1914 the British government knew little and cared less about the subject nationalities of eastern Europe. Everyone interested in European affairs knew of the Poles and probably possessed a rudimentary understanding of the Polish problem, but there is no evidence that the foreign office knew anything about the complexities of Polish politics. Serbian politics were better understood, because of the previous Balkan crises, but officials were not well informed about the Austrian South Slavs who were more often referred to as Bosnians, Serbo-Croatians, Croats, Slovenes and Serbs than as South Slavs; the term ‘Yugoslav’ was a novelty. The Bohemians or Czechs were known but very few had heard of the Slovaks; Czechoslovakia was not yet even a geographical expression. The government knew little of these nationalities because it was not interested in them and because it had no reason to be interested in them.

The British government entered the conflict in 1914 in order to maintain the existing balance of power in western Europe which would be upset either by the violation of Belgian neutrality or by the destruction of France as a great power. The Polish and Czechoslovak problems were totally irrelevant to the July crisis and to the actions of the British government. Although the crisis which precipitated the war stemmed originally from the South Slav problem, this was not a factor in the British decision to enter the conflict.

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Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 1976

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  • Conclusion
  • Kenneth J. Calder
  • Book: Britain and the Origins of the New Europe 1914–1918
  • Online publication: 07 October 2011
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511897153.011
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  • Conclusion
  • Kenneth J. Calder
  • Book: Britain and the Origins of the New Europe 1914–1918
  • Online publication: 07 October 2011
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511897153.011
Available formats
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Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Conclusion
  • Kenneth J. Calder
  • Book: Britain and the Origins of the New Europe 1914–1918
  • Online publication: 07 October 2011
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511897153.011
Available formats
×