Book contents
- Board-Shareholder Dialogue
- International Corporate Law and Financial Market Regulation
- Board-Shareholder Dialogue
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Contributors
- Foreword
- The Dialogue between Corporations and Institutional Investors
- 1 The New Corporate Governance
- 2 Shareholder Voice and Corporate Purpose
- 3 The Purpose of Corporate Purpose Statements
- 4 Systemic Stewardship with Tradeoffs
- 5 Giant Asset Managers, the Big Three, and Index Investing
- 6 Something Old, Something New
- 7 The Perils and Promise of Shareholders as Stakeholder Advocates
- 8 How to Facilitate ESG Investor Engagement
- 9 Emerging ESG-Driven Models of Shareholder Collaborative Engagement
- 10 ESG and Board-Shareholder Engagement in M&A
- 11 How Does Board-Shareholder Engagement Really Work?
- 12 Shareholder Engagement inside and outside the Shareholder Meeting
- 13 The Viability of Blockchain in Corporate Governance
- 14 Shareholder Engagement in East Asia
- 15 Board-Shareholder Engagement and Directors’ Appointments
- 16 Shareholder Proposals and the Debate over Sustainability Disclosure
- 17 Board-Shareholder Engagement and Disclosure Obligations under Corporate Governance Codes
- 18 Board-Shareholder Engagement and Insider Regulation
- 19 Market Soundings Rules
5 - Giant Asset Managers, the Big Three, and Index Investing
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 31 August 2024
- Board-Shareholder Dialogue
- International Corporate Law and Financial Market Regulation
- Board-Shareholder Dialogue
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Contributors
- Foreword
- The Dialogue between Corporations and Institutional Investors
- 1 The New Corporate Governance
- 2 Shareholder Voice and Corporate Purpose
- 3 The Purpose of Corporate Purpose Statements
- 4 Systemic Stewardship with Tradeoffs
- 5 Giant Asset Managers, the Big Three, and Index Investing
- 6 Something Old, Something New
- 7 The Perils and Promise of Shareholders as Stakeholder Advocates
- 8 How to Facilitate ESG Investor Engagement
- 9 Emerging ESG-Driven Models of Shareholder Collaborative Engagement
- 10 ESG and Board-Shareholder Engagement in M&A
- 11 How Does Board-Shareholder Engagement Really Work?
- 12 Shareholder Engagement inside and outside the Shareholder Meeting
- 13 The Viability of Blockchain in Corporate Governance
- 14 Shareholder Engagement in East Asia
- 15 Board-Shareholder Engagement and Directors’ Appointments
- 16 Shareholder Proposals and the Debate over Sustainability Disclosure
- 17 Board-Shareholder Engagement and Disclosure Obligations under Corporate Governance Codes
- 18 Board-Shareholder Engagement and Insider Regulation
- 19 Market Soundings Rules
Summary
A robust literature describes the incentives and stewardship practices of the “Big Three” asset managers (BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street Global Advisors), often referring to these asset managers as “passive.” This is so common that the “Big Three,” “index fund,” and “passive manager” are used almost interchangeably by both academics and practitioners. This shorthand emerged in the foundational scholarship in this area, and while it may remain useful in certain contexts, its casual use obscures important features of the market and contributes to misperceptions. In this chapter, we demonstrate that it is a mistake to equate passive investing with index funds; index funds with the Big Three; and the Big Three with giant asset managers. We further sketch some of the consequences of these distinctions and set forth questions for further research.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Board-Shareholder DialoguePolicy Debate, Legal Constraints and Best Practices, pp. 158 - 184Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2024