Introduction

The positive content of immaterialism so far offered in the Principles has been minimal. Sensible qualities are mind-dependent and ordinary objects are nothing but collections of sensible qualities. There are no material substances, but, Berkeley claims, there are spiritual substances. These claims raise a whole host of questions, two of which are of immediate concern. First, sensible qualities are appearances or ideas. They are ‘ideas’ because they are exhausted by appearance and must appear to some mind in order to exist. The ‘hardness or softness, the colour, taste, warmth, figure, and suchlike qualities, which combined together constitute the several sorts of victuals and apparel, have been shewn to exist only in the mind that perceives them; and this is all that is meant by calling them ideas’ (PHK §38). Nevertheless, when we imagine things they are appearances before the mind, and yet we do not count such appearances to the imagination (such ideas) as real things. So, if all is appearance how can we distinguish between real things and imaginary things? Secondly, can any room be found in Berkeley’s system to accommodate the common-sense thought that, say, the pots and pans in my kitchen cupboard continue to exist when I am not perceiving them? On the face of it, it seems not. Sensible objects cannot exist without relation to perception and so it seems that they cannot continue to exist when unperceived. Yet we do not, for example, think that pots and pans in the cupboard cease to exist when we shut the door. So it seems, despite Berkeley’s protestations to the contrary, his system offends common sense.