(An Aristotelian worry about the telic status of energeia)
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 06 December 2010
The question of my title comes to the surface in Metaphysics Θ.8.1050a4–b4. Aristotle is seeking to establish that actuality or activity (energeia) is prior in substance (ousia) to potentiality (dunamis). More precisely, he is trying to show that a given energeia is prior in ousia to the corresponding dunamis. In reaching his conclusion Aristotle relies on the curious assumption that in the case of a transitive activity, for example the activity of a builder transforming materials into a house, the activity itself is located not, as we might expect, in the agent, but in the patient – in this case, in the materials which are coming to be the house (1050a30–4). My object here is to examine this premise and its contribution to the surrounding argument. It will be necessary, however, to look at the whole passage, and in doing so one will find it natural to touch on a few difficulties which do not immediately bear on the question of the location of an activity. Along the way I shall also try to bring out some of the philosophical issues involved.
The demonstration that energeia is prior in ousia to the corresponding dunamis is third in a battery of arguments showing that energeia is prior to dunamis in many ways: in definition, in time (although this conclusion is qualified) and in ousia (1049a4ff.).
To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure [email protected] is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.
To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.
To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.