We use variations on a relatively transparent, two-person extensive form bargaining game to examine principles of self-evident play (Kreps, 1990a) using experimental analysis. Our game is transparent if players can be expected to understand the relationship between the possible sequences of plays with their counterparts and the resulting payoffs that can be achieved. However, how to develop strategy for a relatively transparent game may not be self-evident because it requires players to be confident about their counterparts' actions and reactions. So, when are players likely to be mutually confident?

Evolutionary psychology provides one approach to answering this question. Hoffman et al. (1996b) and the references therein give a more extended discussion of the role of evolutionary psychology in explaining many economics experiments that exhibit anomalous behavior relative to standard theory. Even though economic theory assumes that individuals employ general purpose consciously cognitive algorithms to optimize gains in any situation, evolutionary psychology assumes that individuals deploy domain-specific cognitive algorithms, with different algorithms being used for different situations, often in nonconscious ways. Economic theory disciplines our thinking by requiring behaviors that maximize individual utility, whereas evolutionary psychology disciplines our thinking by requiring blue-prints for behavioral activity that can be adapted under natural selection. Of course the relative value of these blueprints from nature depends on their subsequent development by cultural interaction (nurture) and a continuing evaluation of behavioral success through experience.

In this chapter, we address the following question: Can we use principles from game theory, experimental economics, and evolutionary psychology to better understand what is self-evident to players playing our extensive form games?

I. Principles of Behavior

The fundamental principles which underpin the propositions we examine experimentally can be stated as follows:…