The second part of the book investigates the implementation of the policy. As far as preventive surveillance is concerned, at its core lay the country-specific recommendations on the macroeconomic policies of the member states. These recommendations are the object of intense negotiations between the Commission and the Council. Why are they a matter of bargaining? What shapes the Council’s propensity to modify the Commission’s proposals and what affects their strengthening or weakening? This chapter employs bargaining and compliance theories to address these questions. Analyzing the recommendations issued between 1999 and 2019, it shows that the Council is rather active in modifying the Commission’s assessments and strengthens four-fifths of the recommending provisions that it decides to modify. Economic and supranational factors dominate this process. Governments balance the pressures originating from the bargaining dynamic within the Council with the need to preserve policy credibility and effectiveness in the face of noncompliance and worsening economic conditions.