Decision-making is the core function of command. Successful decisions, which manage the risks of the battlefield and thereby optimise the chances of success, depend on judgement, and judgement is gained through a combination of training and experience. This book has charted the AMF's accumulation of command experience during the Second World War and the development of a centralised and universal system of training based on it. These were the foundations of the high level of command proficiency achieved in the latter years of the war.

The story of Australian battalion command in the Second World War is one of improvisation, adaptation and evolution. COs were just one part of a battalion command system. Where elements of this system were found to be ill-suited to the nature of operations they were seeking to control, COs had to take action to compensate. As a result, the manner in which command was exercised varied widely across the theatres in which Australian battalions fought. In the Mediterranean theatres of 1941 COs employed a variety of measures in an attempt to overcome the control difficulties presented by inexperienced soldiers and officers and inadequate communications. Their own inexperience often hampered their decisions, and standards were uneven. In 1945 command practice was much more uniform, as most COs had several years of active service experience behind them, and good communications and experienced troops facilitated strong control. In Malaya and Singapore COs struggled to employ supporting weapons effectively owing to a lack of experience and training; in 1945 these weapons were central to the Australian way of war.