Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Tables and Figures
- Preface
- 1 Constitutional Quandaries and Social Choice
- 2 Power and Social Choice
- 3 Franklin and the War of Independence
- 4 Madison, Jefferson, and Condorcet
- 5 Lincoln and the Civil War
- 6 Johnson and the Critical Realignment of 1964
- 7 Keynes and the Atlantic Constitution
- 8 Preferences and Beliefs
- 9 Political Change
- Bibliography
- Index
- POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INSTITUTIONS AND DECISIONS
4 - Madison, Jefferson, and Condorcet
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 23 November 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Tables and Figures
- Preface
- 1 Constitutional Quandaries and Social Choice
- 2 Power and Social Choice
- 3 Franklin and the War of Independence
- 4 Madison, Jefferson, and Condorcet
- 5 Lincoln and the Civil War
- 6 Johnson and the Critical Realignment of 1964
- 7 Keynes and the Atlantic Constitution
- 8 Preferences and Beliefs
- 9 Political Change
- Bibliography
- Index
- POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INSTITUTIONS AND DECISIONS
Summary
THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION
A constitution is almost a living entity, but it also incorporates institutional features, “the rules of the game in a society, or more formally the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction” (North, 1990: 3). Much more important than the rules themselves is the conceptual basis for the acceptance of these rules. To use the terminology of game theory, the beliefs that underpin the constitution must themselves generally be in equilibrium. That is, under “normal” circumstances, the rules of the constitution are grounded in what I have called a core belief. This is not to assert that the core belief remains unchanged during normal times; if change does occur it will be gradual. In extraordinary times, however, the core belief is fractured in some fashion, typically because of the realization that the society is faced with a deep “quandary.” Such a quandary may be due to an inconsistency, internal to the logical structure of the core beliefs, or to a disjunction between the core belief and some external aspect of social reality. When society faces a deep quandary, then mutually incompatible beliefs may population the society; very often a new equilibrium is attained only in the aftermath of war.
The core belief will generally consist of a number of components, and if one of these is called into question in a profound fashion, then the belief in the relevance of the entire constitution may fail. For example, as Chapter 7 observes, the events of the Depression during the 1930s cast doubt on the belief in the compatibility of the free-market system and democracy.
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- Information
- Architects of Political ChangeConstitutional Quandaries and Social Choice Theory, pp. 98 - 134Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2006