This chapter examines relationality objections to intervention in nature. It starts by reconstructing Clare Palmer’s contextual approach, according to which we are not usually required to assist wild animals due to the lack of prior morally relevant entanglements with them. It rejects these grounds for determining positive obligations, arguing that it implausibly implies there is no requirement to help distant human beings in need due to natural causes or to benefit others at no cost. Next, it offers a case for construing Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka’s account in Zoopolis of our political duties toward wild animals in a way that much more pervasive interventions in nature may be required. If we have a duty to ensure that the environment meets wild animals’ needs, facts suggest that the satisfaction of wild animals’ needs does not depend on the preservation of their natural environments. Instead, we should favor some form of environmental enhancement, that is, any modification of environmental conditions with a net positive effect on nonhuman well-being.