These notes cover only a part of the vast and growing literature on the subject. I indicate the readings that most influenced the writing of this book and other sources the curious reader might next consult.

The Prehistory of Rights

Although MacIntyre (1981) and Dover (1974) find ancient Greece not to have been receptive to our notions of rights, Fred D. Miller (1995) argues a contrary result. Joseph Raz (2004) explains that possessing the concept of a practice (such as respecting rights) is not essential to engaging in that practice. That the Romans were in firm command of subjective rights is argued in Witte, Jr. (2007). My discussion of the mediaeval disputes is heavily indebted to Tuck’s account (1979). Schneewind (1998) and Skinner (1978) are also extremely helpful, and on the “peculiar institution” of slavery, Davis (1966) is indispensable. The differences between Lee Kuan Yew and Amartya Sen are set out by Sen (1999). Glendon (1991) cautions against the contemporary obsession with rights, and Wellman (1998) and others warn of the expansionary tendency of loose rights-talk. The “endowment effect” has been confirmed experimentally by Thaler (1990).