The war as December began looked quite different from what it had been when the United States had first taken up the sword eight months earlier. With their armies exhausted and demoralized, the French and British leadership by necessity adopted a defensive strategy. As early as October 1917, Pétain had told his British counterpart Haig that he had no future plans for a major offensive. During the following months, the French Army participated only in limited local attacks with battalions rather than divisions. Haig had been reluctant to abandon the offensive, but he had little choice, especially after the Permanent Military Representatives on the Supreme War Council recommended a defensive stance. On December 19, 1917 Robertson assured the War Cabinet that it was “fully realised by Sir Douglas Haig that we must act on the defence for some time to come,” and that he had “no offensive plans in mind at present.”

With the Allies embracing a defensive strategy in the west, two critical questions were: Would the Germans seek victory in 1918 with an all-out offensive in France? And, if they did, could American reinforcements arrive in time to avert disaster? French and British intelligence made generally accurate forecasts about the large number of enemy divisions being transferred from the Eastern Front and predicted a German offensive as early as March 1918. But many doubted that Germany would deplete its manpower in an all-out effort given the failure of either side to breach the other’s strong defenses on the Western Front during the previous three years. Lloyd George, for example, wrote on one of Sir William Robertson’s appreciations predicting a powerful German offensive in 1918: “By all means. Nothing would suit us better – but unfortunately he has learnt his lesson.”