Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-m6dg7 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-12T20:48:27.603Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

13 - Cantigny

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 July 2014

David Woodward
Affiliation:
Marshall University, West Virginia
Get access

Summary

By the previous standards of trench warfare on the Western Front Ludendorff’s offensives in March and April had been great successes. His armies twice broke through the British front and rapidly advanced across open terrain. But the semi-mobility achieved by the rupture of the British front could not be maintained, and these break-ins could not be converted to a break-out. Slow-moving and often unreliable tanks (of which the Germans had few) could not maintain the momentum of the drive. Nor could mounted soldiers who were extremely vulnerable to machine guns. Cratered battlefields made the forward movement of big guns difficult, and infantry proved helpless once it got beyond the range of its own artillery. Logistics also played a central role as German troops marched well beyond their railheads. As infantry outdistanced its artillery and supplies these offensives lost their momentum and inevitably ground to a halt. The will of the British remained unbroken.

As his casualties mounted, Ludendorff’s position began to appear untenable. “He had become a typical chair-borne general who conducted operations from an office desk,” concluded Walter Goerlitz. “Clausewitz had designated strategy as the art of applying available means. Ludendorff could no longer distinguish between what was possible and what was not. Everything was possible if you barked out the order for it in a loud, gruff tone of voice.” His offensives created bulges in the enemy’s front but they also created vulnerable salients his own troops had to defend. Occupying makeshift defenses along an expanded front with precarious flanks, his armies were now much more vulnerable than previously when they occupied the strongest defensive positions on the Western Front.

Type
Chapter
Information
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2014

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure [email protected] is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

  • Cantigny
  • David Woodward, Marshall University, West Virginia
  • Book: The American Army and the First World War
  • Online publication: 05 July 2014
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511984563.015
Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

  • Cantigny
  • David Woodward, Marshall University, West Virginia
  • Book: The American Army and the First World War
  • Online publication: 05 July 2014
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511984563.015
Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Cantigny
  • David Woodward, Marshall University, West Virginia
  • Book: The American Army and the First World War
  • Online publication: 05 July 2014
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511984563.015
Available formats
×