As the outcome of the war hung in the balance following the first of five German offensives, the War Department and Chaumont confronted critical decisions that might well determine the success or failure of Berlin’s attempt to become the dominant European power. By default the United States had become the manpower reserve for the Entente. Approximately one-half of America’s male population by war’s end had either registered for the draft or was serving in the armed forces. This vast untapped reserve of manpower seemed to represent the Entente’s best hope of thwarting German expansionism.

A credible American force in Europe, however, seemed in the distant future after Ludendorff virtually destroyed the British 5th Army. On April 10, Major General Whigham, the deputy CIGS, informed the British War Cabinet that the United States had only 319,000 men in France and most of these soldiers were not riflemen. Pershing had insisted upon shipping many noncombatants, including many black soldiers who were provided with shovels rather than rifles, to give him the necessary logistical support for an independent force. Of this number only 70,000 US troops were thought ready to enter the fighting line. An additional 10,000 troops were in the United Kingdom. But questions quickly emerged about the combat readiness of even this small number of riflemen. On April 24, the War Cabinet learned that American soldiers “with six months’ training were to be found side by side with raw recruits.” Pershing himself had confirmed that this was true and “expressed surprise at the occurrence, which he supposed was due to the haste with which the orders to push forward troops had been carried out.”