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Bibliography

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 October 2021

Edited by
Veronica Rodriguez-Blanco  and
George Pavlakos
Veronica Rodriguez-Blanco
Affiliation:
University of Surrey
George Pavlakos
Affiliation:
University of Glasgow
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Agency, Negligence and Responsibility , pp. 242 - 256
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2021

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