After the Accord Book contents
- After the Accord
- Studies in Macroeconomic History
- After the Accord
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Charts
- Tables
- Boxes
- Foreword
- Acknowledgments
- Treasury Officials
- Federal Reserve Officials
- The Many Varieties of Dealer
- 1 Introduction
- Part I The System and the Market in the 1940s
- Part II The Accord and Its Aftermath
- Part III The New Regime
- Contents
- 10 Monetary Policy in 1954
- 11 Policy Instruments for Reserves Management
- 12 Monetary Policy in 1955
- 13 Pragmatism in the Accommodation of Treasury Offerings
- 14 1956 and 1957
- Part IV Summer 1958 and Its Consequences
- Part V The End of Bills Preferably
- Part VI The 1960s
- Part VII Updating Market Infrastructures
- Part VIII The 1970s
- Part IX Infrastructure in the 1970s
- References
- Index
11 - Policy Instruments for Reserves Management
from Part III - The New Regime
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 14 January 2021
- After the Accord
- Studies in Macroeconomic History
- After the Accord
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Charts
- Tables
- Boxes
- Foreword
- Acknowledgments
- Treasury Officials
- Federal Reserve Officials
- The Many Varieties of Dealer
- 1 Introduction
- Part I The System and the Market in the 1940s
- Part II The Accord and Its Aftermath
- Part III The New Regime
- Contents
- 10 Monetary Policy in 1954
- 11 Policy Instruments for Reserves Management
- 12 Monetary Policy in 1955
- 13 Pragmatism in the Accommodation of Treasury Offerings
- 14 1956 and 1957
- Part IV Summer 1958 and Its Consequences
- Part V The End of Bills Preferably
- Part VI The 1960s
- Part VII Updating Market Infrastructures
- Part VIII The 1970s
- Part IX Infrastructure in the 1970s
- References
- Index
Summary
Having settled, at least for the time being, on free reserves as a policy guide, the FOMC had to identify one or more instruments that it could use to expand or contract the size of the System Open Market Account according to the policy decisions of the Committee. Bills sufficed for operations of a modest size (no more than about $200 million) intended to remain in place for several weeks, but they were not liquid enough for larger operations expected to be quickly reversed. As a result, and in the face of strenuous objections from some Committee members, the Committee came to rely on repurchase agreements when it wanted to sterilize transient fluctuations in autonomous factors.
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- After the AccordA History of Federal Reserve Open Market Operations, the US Government Securities Market, and Treasury Debt Management from 1951 to 1979, pp. 150 - 166Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2021