After the Accord A History of Federal Reserve Open Market Operations, the US Government Securities Market, and Treasury Debt Management from 1951 to 1979
Book contents
- After the Accord
- Studies in Macroeconomic History
- After the Accord
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Charts
- Tables
- Boxes
- Foreword
- Acknowledgments
- Treasury Officials
- Federal Reserve Officials
- The Many Varieties of Dealer
- 1 Introduction
- Part I The System and the Market in the 1940s
- Part II The Accord and Its Aftermath
- Contents
- 5 The Accord
- 6 Taking Stock
- 7 New Directions
- 8 Challenging the New Restrictions
- 9 An Additional Limitation on the Conduct of Open Market Operations
- Part III The New Regime
- Part IV Summer 1958 and Its Consequences
- Part V The End of Bills Preferably
- Part VI The 1960s
- Part VII Updating Market Infrastructures
- Part VIII The 1970s
- Part IX Infrastructure in the 1970s
- References
- Index
8 - Challenging the New Restrictions
from Part II - The Accord and Its Aftermath
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 14 January 2021
Book contents
- After the Accord
- Studies in Macroeconomic History
- After the Accord
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Charts
- Tables
- Boxes
- Foreword
- Acknowledgments
- Treasury Officials
- Federal Reserve Officials
- The Many Varieties of Dealer
- 1 Introduction
- Part I The System and the Market in the 1940s
- Part II The Accord and Its Aftermath
- Contents
- 5 The Accord
- 6 Taking Stock
- 7 New Directions
- 8 Challenging the New Restrictions
- 9 An Additional Limitation on the Conduct of Open Market Operations
- Part III The New Regime
- Part IV Summer 1958 and Its Consequences
- Part V The End of Bills Preferably
- Part VI The 1960s
- Part VII Updating Market Infrastructures
- Part VIII The 1970s
- Part IX Infrastructure in the 1970s
- References
- Index
Summary
Describes the efforts of Allan Sproul, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, to weaken the operating restrictions imposed in March 1953, Sproul’s initial success following a break in the bill market in late May, and his ultimate failure when FOMC members decided to retain in their own hands (rather than delegate to the manager of the Open Market Account) the authority to breach the restrictions.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- After the AccordA History of Federal Reserve Open Market Operations, the US Government Securities Market, and Treasury Debt Management from 1951 to 1979, pp. 107 - 124Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2021