Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of figures
- List of tables
- List of contributors
- Foreword
- Introduction
- I Monetary institutions and policy
- 1 Reputational versus institutional solutions to the time-consistency problem in monetary policy
- 2 Reciprocity and political business cycles in federal monetary unions
- 3 The ultimate determinants of central bank independence
- 4 Central bank autonomy and exchange rate regimes – their effects on monetary accommodation and activism
- 5 Uncertainty, instrument choice, and the uniqueness of Nash equilibrium: microeconomic and macroeconomic examples
- Comment
- 6 New empirical evidence on the costs of European Monetary Union
- II Exchange rate policy and redistribution
- Index
Comment
from 5 - Uncertainty, instrument choice, and the uniqueness of Nash equilibrium: microeconomic and macroeconomic examples
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 September 2013
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Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of figures
- List of tables
- List of contributors
- Foreword
- Introduction
- I Monetary institutions and policy
- 1 Reputational versus institutional solutions to the time-consistency problem in monetary policy
- 2 Reciprocity and political business cycles in federal monetary unions
- 3 The ultimate determinants of central bank independence
- 4 Central bank autonomy and exchange rate regimes – their effects on monetary accommodation and activism
- 5 Uncertainty, instrument choice, and the uniqueness of Nash equilibrium: microeconomic and macroeconomic examples
- Comment
- 6 New empirical evidence on the costs of European Monetary Union
- II Exchange rate policy and redistribution
- Index
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- Positive Political EconomyTheory and Evidence, pp. 154 - 161Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1998