Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Contributors
- Preface
- 1 Social Psychology of Social Order: An Introduction
- 2 The Evolutionary Biology and Sociology of Social Order
- 3 Social Rationality and Weak Solidarity: A Coevolutionary Approach to Social Order
- 4 An Integrative Theory of Action: The Model of Frame Selection
- 5 The Center Cannot Hold: Networks, Echo Chambers, and Polarization
- 6 Social Exchange and Social Order: An Affect Theory Approach
- 7 Institutions, Trust, and Social Order
- 8 Identity Verifi cation and the Social Order
- 9 Identities, Roles, and Social Institutions: An Affect Control Account of Social Order
- 10 The Gender Frame and Social Order
- 11 Status, Power, and Social Order
- 12 Interaction Order: The Making of Social Facts
- 13 The Arts of Together: Social Coordination as Dyadic Achievement
- 14 Dignity as Moral Motivation: The Problem of Social Order Writ Small
- 15 The Legitimacy of Groups and the Mobilization of Resources
- Commentary: Contrasts and Complementarities
- Index
- References
15 - The Legitimacy of Groups and the Mobilization of Resources
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 December 2015
Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Contributors
- Preface
- 1 Social Psychology of Social Order: An Introduction
- 2 The Evolutionary Biology and Sociology of Social Order
- 3 Social Rationality and Weak Solidarity: A Coevolutionary Approach to Social Order
- 4 An Integrative Theory of Action: The Model of Frame Selection
- 5 The Center Cannot Hold: Networks, Echo Chambers, and Polarization
- 6 Social Exchange and Social Order: An Affect Theory Approach
- 7 Institutions, Trust, and Social Order
- 8 Identity Verifi cation and the Social Order
- 9 Identities, Roles, and Social Institutions: An Affect Control Account of Social Order
- 10 The Gender Frame and Social Order
- 11 Status, Power, and Social Order
- 12 Interaction Order: The Making of Social Facts
- 13 The Arts of Together: Social Coordination as Dyadic Achievement
- 14 Dignity as Moral Motivation: The Problem of Social Order Writ Small
- 15 The Legitimacy of Groups and the Mobilization of Resources
- Commentary: Contrasts and Complementarities
- Index
- References
Summary
Abstract
The legitimacy of a group has important consequences for social order: It is a condition under which the collective interest over-rides self interest. The present chapter is a theory that describes how and under what conditions groups that depend for their survival on mobilizing the resources of their own members acquire legitimacy and its consequences for the organizational capacity of the group. Legitimacy is not only a condition of collective rationality, it is also a mechanism of achieving it. Previous research finds that cooperation is conditional on the cooperation of others. Legitimacy at the collective level assures the cooperation of others. The structure of the mechanism itself has an important implication for the problem of order: Much theory of legitimacy thinks of legitimacy as consent. Coercion is its antonym. But legitimacy at the collective level creates both consent and coercion. It depends on both to achieve collective rationality. It is based on principal, but principal backed by sanctions. But coercion absent legitimacy is resisted, costly, depends on capricious, unstable, resources. A stable social order therefore depends not only on principal backed by coercion but also on coercion backed by principal.
INTRODUCTION
In most theories of legitimacy, its importance derives from the impotence of pure power. Classic theories of legitimacy were mostly concerned with the stability of systems of power (Zelditch 2001). Compliance induced by the naked exercise of power is involuntary. Involuntary compliance induces resistance (Lovaglia 1995). Resistance escalates the transaction costs of exercising power– the costs of monitoring and punishing noncompliance, the costs of police forces, armies, and prisons (Hechter 1984). Furthermore, absent legitimacy, the incentives motivating police forces, armies, and prisons are purely instrumental, often unreliable in bad times (Gellner 1983:22). A stable system of power therefore depends, at least in part, on consent. Its legitimacy, its acceptance as “right” even by those disadvantaged by it (Anderson et al. 2005; Connel 1992; Linz 1978), is important because it gives rise to consent.
The power these theories are talking about is the power of one actor over another, inter-personal or “micro” power (the sort of power analyzed by Emerson (1962) or Willer and Anderson (1981)).
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Order on the Edge of ChaosSocial Psychology and the Problem of Social Order, pp. 286 - 306Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2015
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