Abstract

The question of how norm adherence comes about against all temptations and fears of exploitation continues to loom large in the explanation of social order. It also divides major paradigms in the social sciences, most notably the normative paradigm that views norms as unconditional imperatives and the utilitarian paradigm that regards them as one conditional incentive among others. We introduce the model of frame selection (Esser 2009; Kroneberg 2014) as an integrative theory of action that reconciles these views and allows one to consider the interplay of interests, institutions, and ideas in the explanation of social order. Building on and formalizing insights gained in cognitive social psychology, this dual-process model pinpoints the conditions under which norms will be followed spontaneously rather than being subject to trade-offs. The model yields specific and testable hypotheses and has been applied in diverse fields of sociological research.

THE PROBLEM

The emergence of social order constitutes one of the fundamental problems in the social sciences. It involves the reliable regulation and stabilization of actions within social situations, even against conflicting interests and opportunities. This problem varies in character and severity, ranging from achieving coordination among actors with shared interests to ensuring mutual cooperation despite incentives to free ride in social dilemmas, to overcoming conflicts in which the gain of one actor involves the other's loss. These different problems call for different solutions. Coordination problems can be solved by simple agreements or conventions. Dilemma situations, however, already constitute a problem of “antagonistic cooperation”: notwithstanding the potential gains of mutual cooperation, there is always the temptation to free ride on others’ contributions as well as the fear that one's own contribution will be exploited. This particularly applies to the production of collective goods, which also includes the establishment of institutions that are capable of enforcing order in case of conflicts. Norms constitute an especially important (although not the only) solution to the problem of social order. However, the crucial question then becomes whether and how norm adherence comes about against all temptations and fears of exploitation.