Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Notes on Contributors
- Perceptual, Reflective and Affective Consciousness as Existence?
- The Domain of Folk Psychology
- Minds, Persons and the Unthinkable
- Moderately Massive Modularity
- A Theory of Phenomenal Concepts
- Free Will and the Burden of Proof
- Materialism and the First Person
- Language, Belief and Human Beings
- Human Minds
- Non-Personal Minds
- Personal Agency
- Mental Substances
- Mind and Illusion
- Index
Preface
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 04 August 2010
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Notes on Contributors
- Perceptual, Reflective and Affective Consciousness as Existence?
- The Domain of Folk Psychology
- Minds, Persons and the Unthinkable
- Moderately Massive Modularity
- A Theory of Phenomenal Concepts
- Free Will and the Burden of Proof
- Materialism and the First Person
- Language, Belief and Human Beings
- Human Minds
- Non-Personal Minds
- Personal Agency
- Mental Substances
- Mind and Illusion
- Index
Summary
The papers collected in this volume are based on the lectures given in London as the Royal Institute of Philosophy's annual lecture series for 2001–2 under the title of Minds and Persons. If nothing else, the range and diversity of the lectures demonstrate the complexity of the topics discussed and the multiplicity of approaches to them in current philisophical discussion. It would be fair to say both that some of the leading contributors to that discussion are represented in this volume and also that within it there are some strikingly orginal theses and arguments.
On behalf of the Royal Institute of Philosophy, I would like to thank all the contributors both for their lectures and for the papers based on the lectures. I would also like to thank Sophie Allen once again for her invaluable help in the preparation of the volume and of the index.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Minds and Persons , pp. v - viPublisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2003