In Chapter 7, I argue that the solidarity rationale for the PDE from Chapter 3 enables a response to Joshua Greene’s argument that findings from empirical psychology debunk deontological constraints on causing harm. Greene’s deontological debunking argument is based on the dual-process theory of moral judgment, and I begin by reviewing the main elements of this theory. Next, I describe the two stages of Greene’s debunking argument. Stage 1 aims to debunk the case-based intuitions that seem to support deontology over consequentialism, while Stage 2 aims to debunk deontological normative ethics. I argue that Stage 2 of Greene’s argument is unsatisfactory, and I explain why it fails to undermine the solidarity rationale for the PDE. Finally, I outline two possible explanations of why our case-based intuitions should be sensitive (even if imperfectly) to a feature of conduct – intentional harm – that is morally significant.