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Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 November 2024

Pamela Ban
Affiliation:
University of California, San Diego
Ju Yeon Park
Affiliation:
Ohio State University
Hye Young You
Affiliation:
Princeton University, New Jersey
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Chapter
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Hearings on the Hill
The Politics of Informing Congress
, pp. 175 - 186
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2024

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